Puzzle of the New World Order: Investigating the Legal War Against Russia (1991–2026)

PUZZLE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER

A Retrospective Investigation: 1991–2026. How the Events of Recent Decades Form a Single Picture of the Legal War Against Russia

Disclaimer:

This material is a research essay prepared by the editorial board of the journals Kafedra and SforNews as part of a series of analytical investigations. The work is based on a methodology of systemic diagnostics, involving the analysis of events not only through the lens of simple human logic or ethics, but also using all documents, artifacts, and alternative legal constructs available to the editorial board. The materials that come into our field of view may not have wide public recognition, but they allow us to clarify the situation and provide a coherent explanation for what is happening. We do not claim that the interpretation offered is the only correct or officially recognized one. We invite readers to join our research and independently evaluate the arguments presented.

Introduction: Why the Past Does Not Pass

But something went wrong.

Today, through the lens of new artifacts that have come to the attention of our editorial board, we see a different picture. What seemed like a “step toward greatness” may turn out to be part of a much more complex puzzle — a puzzle assembled not in the Kremlin, but in Washington, London, and Brussels. And in this puzzle, Russia was not a player, but a piece.

In this investigation, we will attempt to revisit the key events of 1991–2026 through the lens of our central hypothesis: the legal uncertainty of the Russian Federation’s status as the successor state to the USSR.

Part 1. The Beginning: 1991 and the Illegitimate Succession

According to the UN Charter, the permanent member of the Security Council is the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Not the Russian Federation, but the USSR [1].

After the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, Russia’s membership in the UN and the Security Council was formalized through a letter from President Yeltsin dated December 24, 1991, requesting the use of the name “Russian Federation” instead of “USSR” [2]. This was not a formal procedure for changing the successor state — it was an administrative replacement of a nameplate.

International lawyer Yehuda Zvi Blum argued that “with the termination of the existence of the Soviet Union itself, its membership in the UN should have automatically ceased, and Russia should have been admitted to membership just like the other former Soviet republics” [3].

Thus, the legal legitimacy of Russia’s UN membership and, critically, its veto power in the Security Council has never been beyond dispute [4]. Ukrainian diplomats have argued that Russia was never formally recognized as the successor state to the USSR, and therefore its veto power should be annulled [5]. Resolutions have also been introduced in the US Congress expressing the position that Congress “does not recognize the Russian Federation as the successor to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’ seat as a permanent member of the UN Security Council” [6].

Part 2. 2014: Crimea — A Step Toward Sovereignty or a Trap?

2.1. What Happened

In March 2014, following the change of power in Kiev, Russia held a referendum in Crimea and incorporated the peninsula into its territory. The West reacted harshly: the US and the EU imposed the first sanctions against Russia, calling Moscow’s actions “annexation” and a “gross military invasion” [7].

2.2. Assessment at the Time

In 2014, like many, I perceived this as a demonstration of strength. Russia showed that it was ready to defend its interests, that it was an independent player that could not be ignored. This was a signal: “We have returned to the political arena as a great power.”

2.3. New Perspective: What If It Was a Trap?

Today, with access to the documents and artifacts we are studying, the picture looks different.

Hypothesis: The Crimean operation was provoked by the West as a trigger to launch the mechanism of isolating Russia.

Pay attention to the chronology. Western countries did not simply “express outrage” — they immediately, in a coordinated manner and without hesitation, imposed sanctions that damaged their own interests as well. Europe agreed to this, “despite the risk of economic damage to the EU countries themselves” [8].

Why did the US so persistently push Europe toward sanctions, knowing they would harm the European economy?

The answer may be this: the sanctions were needed not to “punish” Russia. They were needed to launch a process of economic isolation that would create the prerequisites for revising its legal status. If Russia cannot be a full-fledged participant in the global economy, then its claims to the status of the USSR’s successor become vulnerable.

Part 3. Sanctions: Why Europe Suffered More Than Russia

3.1. What Happened

Since 2014, the sanctions pressure on Russia has only intensified. By 2022, after the start of the Special Military Operation, an unprecedented package of restrictions was imposed. Europe lost cheap energy resources, sales markets, and suffered colossal economic losses [9].

3.2. The Paradox

Sanctions caused greater damage to Europe than to Russia. European industry was left without cheap gas, inflation soared, and competitiveness declined. The US, on the other hand, gained: American LNG flooded the European market at inflated prices [10].

3.3. Hypothesis: Europe — a Pawn in a Larger Game

If we accept our hypothesis about the legal uncertainty of Russia’s status, then sanctions are not just “punishment.” They are a tool for weakening the Russian economy to a state where its sovereignty becomes a fiction.

By agreeing to sanctions, Europe is effectively participating in the process of destroying the economic base of a potential successor to the USSR. This creates a legal precedent: if Russia cannot fulfill its economic obligations, its claims to the status of “continuator” of the USSR become even more dubious.

It is no coincidence that in 2024–2026, voices questioning the legitimacy of Russia’s membership in the UN Security Council are growing louder. Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski stated that “Russia’s presence in the UN Security Council as the successor to the Soviet Union raises doubts” [11].

This process did not begin in 2022. It began in 2014, when sanctions became a system rather than a one-off action.

Part 4. “Gas for Rubles”: An Attempt to Save Sovereignty

4.1. What Happened

On March 23, 2022, Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would sell gas to “unfriendly countries” only for rubles. This was a response to the freezing of Russian assets and disconnection from SWIFT [12].

4.2. Assessment at the Time

This was perceived as a breakthrough decision that was supposed to strengthen the ruble, weaken the dollar, and show that Russia was not giving up. As is well known, Europe was forced to agree to this scheme.

4.3. New Perspective: A Step Toward the Destruction of a Unified Legal Framework

Today we see this step differently. “Gas for rubles” is not just a “measure against sanctions.” It is an attempt to create an alternative settlement circuit that does not depend on the dollar and SWIFT.

But why did it not fully succeed? Because Europe, by agreeing to ruble settlements, legitimized the very existence of “unfriendly countries” as a legal category. It acknowledged that relations with Russia are built not on the basis of international law, but on the basis of political conjuncture.

In our hypothesis, this is an important step: the destruction of a unified legal framework. If Europe agrees to special trading conditions with Russia, it means it recognizes that Russia is not an ordinary partner, but a subject with a special (diminished) status.

Part 5. The 2020 Pandemic: A Stress Test

5.1. What Happened

In 2020, the world was gripped by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Russian economy, like the economies of other countries, faced a deep crisis shock. In addition to the decline, sanctions and instability in hydrocarbon prices played a role [13].

5.2. An Unexpected Effect

The New York Times noted that “years of economic isolation and massive financial reserves helped Russia weather the economic fallout of the pandemic with little damage” [14].

5.3. Hypothesis: The Pandemic as a “Rehearsal”

From the perspective of our hypothesis, the pandemic became a test of the Russian economy’s viability in the face of an external shock. Russia passed it — but paid for it with enormous reserves.

The West may have drawn conclusions: Russia’s economy is resilient to external shocks, but only as long as reserves exist. The next blow should be aimed at exhausting these reserves. And such a blow was delivered in 2022.

Part 6. The 2022 Special Military Operation: The Final Act?

6.1. What Happened

On February 24, 2022, Vladimir Putin announced the start of a special military operation in Ukraine. Official goals: protecting residents of Donbas from genocide, demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine, and preventing its accession to NATO [15].

6.2. Assessment at the Time

For many, this came as a shock. Russia, which for decades had tried to integrate into the global economy, suddenly launched a full-scale military conflict. It was perceived as an act of desperation or imperial revenge.

6.3. New Perspective: Completing the Puzzle

If we accept our hypothesis, the SMO is the final act of a scenario that began in 2014.

What if Russia knew that its legal status was under threat? What if the SMO was an attempt to prevent this revision?

Consider the sequence:

From the perspective of our hypothesis, the West wanted not just to “weaken Russia.” It wanted to legally revise its status, strip it of its UN veto power, and force it to abandon the Soviet nuclear arsenal. The SMO was an attempt to prevent this scenario.

Part 7. The Strait of Hormuz: A Test of Resilience

7.1. What Happened

In the spring of 2026, when Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz and the US imposed a naval blockade, oil prices soared to $102 per barrel for Brent [16]. For Russia, one of the world’s largest oil exporters, this created the effect of a “windfall day”: the budget received colossal additional revenues.

According to estimates, the Russian budget could receive about 1 trillion rubles in additional revenues due to the situation in the Strait of Hormuz [17]. The Financial Times estimated Russia’s daily windfall profits from oil sales at $150 million per day [18]. According to Reuters, in April 2026, revenues from Russia’s main oil tax doubled to $9 billion [19]. Analysts from Izvestia predicted that additional oil and gas budget revenues would remain at 800 billion – 1 trillion rubles even after prices fell [20].

7.2. Assessment at the Time

Back then, in the spring of 2026, many perceived this as a “bonus for Russia.” It seemed that the geopolitical conflict in the Middle East was playing into Moscow’s hands, weakening sanctions pressure and filling the budget.

7.3. New Perspective: A Test of Resilience

Today we see a different picture. The Hormuz crisis was not a “bonus” but a test — a test of how the Russian elite would handle sudden windfall profits.

Where did the additional revenues go?

According to data that has come to the attention of our editorial board, a significant portion of the windfall profits was not directed toward investment in Russia’s development. Instead, they ended up in the pockets of top managers of state-owned companies, went to offshore accounts, and were spent on the current consumption of elites, rather than on infrastructure modernization, technological sovereignty, or social programs.

This is confirmed by macroeconomic data: despite oil windfall profits, Russia’s economy contracted by 0.3% in the first quarter of 2026 [21]. Moscow lowered its economic growth forecast for 2026 from 1.3% to 0.4% [22]. That is, the money was there, but it did not “translate” into real growth.

7.4. Consequences of the Iranian Memorandum

On June 18, 2026, Trump signed a temporary memorandum with Iran [23]. The Strait of Hormuz was opened. Iranian oil flooded the market. Oil prices collapsed: Brent fell to $77 per barrel, Urals to $63.6 [24].

For Russia, this became a serious challenge. The windfall profits that seemed “eternal” sharply decreased. But the paradox is that even with falling prices, additional budget revenues remained at the level of 800 billion – 1 trillion rubles. That is, the problem was not the absence of money, but how it was being spent.

Part 8. The Investment Contrast: Our Own and Others’

8.1. Easing for “Our Own”

While the Russian elite was receiving windfall profits from Hormuz, the government and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation were simplifying conditions for investments by Russian citizens and companies abroad.

From July 1, 2026, the Bank of Russia is easing the procedure for residents conducting certain currency transactions related to investing in the property of non-residents [25]. Russian residents will no longer need to obtain individual permission from the Central Bank to pay for shares, contributions, and units in the property of non-resident legal entities, provided the total amount of such transactions in favor of one foreign legal entity does not exceed 30 million rubles (previously the limit was 15 million rubles) [26].

At the same time, Russian authorities are working to create a mechanism for exchanging assets of Russian citizens blocked abroad [27].

8.2. Tightening for “Others”

Simultaneously with this, the opposite process is underway from the West — the infringement of the rights of Russians.

Senator Karasin stated that Russians abroad face administrative arbitrariness, politicized decisions, denial of services, account closures, asset freezes, employment and education restrictions [28].

New sanctions packages are being introduced in Europe, including a ban on Russian companies participating in public procurement in EU countries [29]. At the same time, according to a ruling by the EU Court of Justice, the ban on public procurement does not apply if the company is not registered in Russia and there is no risk of funds being diverted to the Russian economy [30].

The Russian Foreign Ministry urged citizens to avoid traveling to 49 unfriendly jurisdictions [31].

8.3. Conclusion: Double Standards as a Systemic Tool

This contrast — easing for Russian investors abroad and simultaneous tightening for Russians in Europe — is not accidental. It reflects a double game:

This directly supports our hypothesis about the legal “suspension” of Russia’s status. If Russia is not the legitimate successor to the USSR, then its citizens do not have unconditional rights under international law.

Part 9. The Socio-Psychological Scenario: Open Borders as the “First Step”

9.1. What Happened

Immediately after the dissolution of the USSR — from the 1990s — Russians gained the opportunity to freely travel abroad, travel, study, work, invest in European real estate, and open bank accounts. European resorts, shops, schools, and medical centers became a familiar part of life for millions [32].

In 2014, despite the first sanctions, this opportunity largely remained. Borders remained open, Russians continued to travel to Europe and use Western infrastructure. This created a persistent illusion of “normal life” and “integration into the global world.”

9.2. Assessment at the Time

For a long time, open borders were perceived as a bonus, as evidence that Russia remained part of the global world and that its citizens were full-fledged participants in the international community.

9.3. New Perspective: The First Step of Systemic Deterioration

Today, through the lens of new artifacts, we see that open borders were not a “bonus” but the first step of systemic deterioration of conditions for ordinary people:

Period	Event	Role in the Scenario
1990s – 2013	Freedom of movement, open borders, access to European goods	Creation of the illusion of “normality” and “integration”
2014	Beginning of sanctions, but borders remain	Illusion strengthened: “sanctions are not about us”
2014–2021	Gradual tightening of visa regimes, banking restrictions, sanctions lists	Beginning of systemic contraction of space for Russians
2022–2026	Mass account freezes, denial of services, discrimination in employment and education, bans on public procurement	Finale: Russians become “second-class citizens” even with European passports

The illusion of “normality” was deliberately created, only to be subsequently destroyed. This is not a coincidence — this is a script.

9.4. Hypothesis: Test or Preparation?

This scenario can be interpreted in two ways:

Option A — Test. The West tested how Russia and its citizens would react to gradually worsening conditions. The reaction — disappointment, but not systemic protest. This allowed the West to move further.

Option B — Preparation. Open borders were part of a strategy of “create dependency, then destroy it.” Russians became accustomed to European comfort and were then deprived of it — which was supposed to cause discontent with the authorities.

9.5. The Socio-Psychological Effect

If the West’s goal is to destabilize Russia from within, then creating and then destroying a “comfortable environment” for ordinary people is an effective tool.

This is a classic socio-psychological scenario.

Part 10. Privatization as an “Archival Sin”

In our previous research, we have mentioned that the privatization of the 1990s in Russia was conducted with gross violations. Today, this topic takes on new meaning.

The Supreme Court of Russia in 2025–2026 recognized the privatization of a number of large enterprises as illegal [33]. This is not just a “fight against oligarchs.” This is recognition that the entire system of property created in the 1990s is legally vulnerable.

If privatization was illegal, then:

This explains why Western elites so easily “abandon” Russian oligarchs. They know: their property is not “sacred private property,” but temporary ownership that can be annulled at any moment.

Conclusion: The Puzzle Is Assembled

If we put all the pieces of the puzzle together, the picture looks like this:

Year	Event	In Our Hypothesis
1991	“Administrative nameplate replacement” at the UN	Legal uncertainty of Russia’s status
1990s	Privatization with violations	Legal vulnerability of the entire property system
2014	Crimea, first sanctions	Launch of the mechanism of Russia’s isolation
2014–2021	Gradual tightening of sanctions	Exhaustion of the economy, creation of precedents
2020	Pandemic	Stress test — passed, but reserves spent
2022	“Gas for rubles”	Attempt to create an alternative circuit
2022	SMO	Attempt to forcefully change the status quo
2026	Hormuz crisis and windfall profits	Test: money went into the pockets of top managers
2026	Iranian memorandum, opening of Hormuz	Economic challenge within the framework of legal revision
2026	Easing for investors, tightening for citizens	Double standard as a systemic tool
2025–2026	Review of privatization, doubts about Russia’s legitimacy in the UN	Legal attack on Russia’s status

Main conclusion: The events of 1991–2026 are not isolated crises. They are a single process in which Russia is consistently losing positions: first political, then economic, then legal. And the finale of this process could be a revision of its status as the successor to the USSR — with the subsequent loss of its UN Security Council seat, nuclear arsenal, and control over assets.

Invitation to Joint Research

The editorial board of the journals Kafedra and SforNews continues to investigate these questions. We have at our disposal documents and artifacts that allow us to view current events from a different angle. We invite lawyers, historians, political scientists, economists, sociologists, and all interested readers to join our project.

We are convinced that only through collective effort — through the exchange of hypotheses, fact-checking, and interdisciplinary analysis — can we approach an understanding of the foundation on which the modern world order actually stands.

Subscribe to Kafedra on Dzen and to SforNews to follow the progress of our investigation.

© Tatiana Burmagina, Editor-in-Chief of the journals Kafedra and SforNews

The material was prepared by the editorial board of the journals Kafedra and SforNews based on open sources, analytical monitoring, and documents within the editorial board’s field of view. When citing, a reference to the original source is required.