US Nuclear Reactor on Moon: The 2030 Race for Lunar Dominance & Resources

30 Aug, 2025
| Salome K

The Moon as a Strategic Chessboard: How America’s Nuclear Reactor Is Shaping the New Space Race

What began in the 1960s as a prestige project between the United States and the Soviet Union is returning today in a new, far more complex form. The 21st-century space race isn’t just about national honor or scientific pride, but about raw materials, strategic advantage, commercial exploitation, and geopolitical dominance. With the American plan to place a nuclear reactor on the moon by 2030, the new race for our natural satellite is finally underway.

A Reactor as a Strategic Forward Post

The core of the US plan is the construction of a 100-kilowatt Fission Surface Power reactor, enough to permanently power a small lunar base. According to Secretary of Transportation and interim NASA administrator Sean Duffy, this is essential for surviving the 14-day lunar nights. The reactor will not only power scientific instruments but also enable future manned missions where astronauts can remain on the lunar surface for extended periods.

But behind the technical motivation lies a strategic logic that extends far beyond mere energy supply. Whoever builds the first sustainable infrastructure on the moon can, in practice, create a kind of “keep-out zone”—a safety zone tolerated by the Artemis Accords, even though the 1967 Outer Space Treaty prohibits formal sovereignty. The reactor thus becomes more than a source of energy: it is a symbol of presence, influence, and deterrence.

The US strategy fits within a broader vision in which the moon functions as an extension of geopolitical influence on Earth. Energy supply and infrastructure in space offer a strategic presence, allowing energy-rich countries to remain long-term and experiment with resource extraction of valuable raw materials such as helium-3 or rare earth elements. Moreover, permanent infrastructure creates diplomatic leverage: countries seeking access to energy, habitats, and research missions will align themselves with the first camp to provide sustainable capacity.

China and Russia: The ILRS Project as a Countermove

The largest geopolitical counterforce comes from the East. China and Russia have been collaborating since 2021 on the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), a project aimed at establishing an operational base in the 2030s. Beijing and Moscow are jointly developing their own energy infrastructure, including plans for a compact nuclear facility to compete with the American reactor.

Their strategy is twofold: technologically, they aim to surpass the US in energy autonomy and logistics, while diplomatically building a coalition of partners around ILRS, including countries like Pakistan, Venezuela, and possibly Turkey. This alternative alliance poses a direct challenge to US dominance in space.

Should the American reactor become operational first, China and Russia risk a symbolic disadvantage that would diminish their diplomatic appeal. The race to the moon is therefore also a race for partners and prestige. Neither country has yet established an alternative legal structure, but they are suggesting a “Moon Governance Framework” within the UN, in which rules are collectively agreed upon rather than through bilateral agreements.

China argues that the Artemis Accords are unilateral and not supported by the UN, while Russia warns that “keep-out zones” open the door to space conflicts and a new arms race. Until now, the US has avoided this multilateral path, fearing that international negotiations would slow its lead.

Legal Struggle for Space Law

International lawyers draw parallels with existing regimes such as the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, which centers on collective use and scientific cooperation. There, no country may claim territorial sovereignty—a model that could serve as inspiration for the moon. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) also offers a precedent: countries may operate economic zones at sea, but under certain conditions and shared oversight. However, the lack of a similar enforcement mechanism in space currently creates uncertainty and increases the risk of unilateral interpretations.

The announcement of the US nuclear reactor raises pressing legal questions about who actually has the authority to decide on lunar infrastructure. The legal basis for all space policy lies in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which stipulates that the moon cannot be subject to national sovereignty, that use and exploration are free for all states, and that states are responsible for damage and safety during space activities.

The American nuclear reactor indirectly challenges these principles. By building a permanent nuclear facility, the US establishes a form of de facto presence that verges on exclusivity. The Outer Space Treaty is silent on “base zones,” but any country that installs infrastructure effectively exercises influence.

The Artemis Accords, a series of bilateral agreements launched by the US since 2020, offer a modern interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty. They introduce the concept of “safety zones” or “keep-out zones .” The idea is that a country can establish a safety perimeter around its activities to prevent accidents. In practice, this means that other states or companies are discouraged from entering that zone.

A more far-reaching treaty, the 1979 Moon Treaty, does stipulate that the moon and its resources may only be exploited based on international agreements on distribution and use. However, this treaty has hardly been ratified—no major space-faring nation has signed up to it, creating legal uncertainty about what is and is not permitted.

Commercial Players and Economic Interests

Besides well-known private players like Firefly Aerospace and Intuitive Machines, giants like SpaceX and Blue Origin are also active in the lunar segment. SpaceX, with its Starship, provides the infrastructure for large-scale landing capacity, while Blue Origin is working on the Blue Moon project for cargo transport. While these initiatives accelerate technological innovation, they also raise questions about liability, environmental impact, and the boundaries of private property rights in space. Without binding rules, there is a risk of legal chaos, with commercial interests overriding the collective good.

Besides states, commercial players are also entering the lunar scene. The American company Firefly Aerospace recently landed its Blue Ghost lander with scientific instruments on the moon, while Intuitive Machines experimented with drones and communications technology. Japanese companies like Ispace are planning repeat attempts despite previous crash landings.

This commercial lunar race is fueled by the suspected presence of valuable natural resources beneath the lunar surface. Helium-3 is considered a potential fuel alternative for nuclear fusion, water ice is important as a life source and for rocket fuel, and there are traces of rare earth elements essential for technology and defense.

The economic potential of lunar exploration is gradually becoming concrete. According to estimates from the American Oak Ridge National Laboratory, helium-3, if fused successfully, could be worth up to $1 billion per ton. The moon may contain up to a million tons of this isotope. Rare earth metals such as yttrium, lanthanum, and neodymium also occur in limited concentrations – essential for batteries, wind turbines, and military applications . The potential value of these raw materials could be in the hundreds of billions, depending on technological feasibility and access rights.

The United States, with its “Space Act,” already allows American companies to mine lunar resources and acquire ownership over them—though not over the lunar surface itself. However, without clear rules or collective oversight, there is no guarantee that commercial activities will be sustainable, transparent, or peaceful.

European Dilemmas and Alliance Strategy

Meanwhile, Europe is torn between various interests and loyalties. The ESA is an official partner in the Artemis program, but European countries are balancing transatlantic loyalty with commercial opportunities in Chinese or bilateral projects. The fact that the American nuclear reactor is coupled with an assertive strategy could complicate diplomacy.

France and Germany see opportunities for nuclear technology and robotics, while Italy and Spain fear that lunar militarization will escalate tensions on Earth. Luxembourg, which is strongly committed to space mining, is primarily concerned with the legal precedent of “keep-out zones” and wants legal certainty regarding ownership rights of extracted resources.

France advocates for a UN-sponsored framework to protect commercial interests, while Germany leans toward cooperation within Artemis but insists on transparency in zone agreements. If the US goes too far with exclusive zones, it could force European countries to act as a bridge between America and the rest of the world.

Future Scenarios: From Diplomacy to Conflict

The coming years will be crucial for the development of space law and the geopolitical relations surrounding the moon. Three main scenarios are emerging for the future.

The first scenario involves unilateral dominance, with the US building the reactor and establishing a keep-out zone, followed by other countries creating their own zones. This would lead to an informal division of the moon without international coordination.

A second possibility is the development of multilateral rules, with pressure from Europe and the UN to develop modern space law, including agreements on energy, mining, and security. This would enable a more coordinated approach to lunar exploitation.

The third and most worrying scenario concerns escalation and conflict, with countries disputing each other’s zones, leading to diplomatic or even military incidents in space. The planned nuclear reactor would then serve as a catalyst for a new Cold War, but in space.

A Multipolar Spatial Order

What is now unfolding is a multipolar space order in which states use infrastructure as an instrument of influence. The lunar reactor is a test case: whoever succeeds in guaranteeing a permanent energy supply will set the tone for resource exploitation, habitat development, and perhaps even military applications.

Besides the major powers the United States, China, and Russia, other countries are also actively involved in building a new space order. India, with its Chandrayaan program, has already successfully conducted missions to the moon and aspires to a broader role as a space power. The United Arab Emirates, which recently conducted a mission to Mars, is also investing heavily in space technology and international partnerships. They can act as liaisons in future multilateral negotiations, as can Turkey, which recently announced its own lunar program. These emerging actors add an extra dimension to the geopolitical chessboard and make space increasingly multipolar.

For the US, a successful lunar reactor would represent a regional anchor point in a new space architecture, similar to the role of military bases in the Indo-Pacific. If the US realizes its plan, it would effectively claim a strategic beachhead on the moon. If China and Russia prove faster or intensify cooperation with third countries, the balance of power will shift.

The moon thus becomes a testing ground for multipolar power dynamics, where energy and presence are the new currency. While legally controversial, “keep-out zones” in practice offer exclusive control over the immediate environment and constitute a new form of territoriality in space.

ⓒ Antonio Georgopalis