Russia and China Reshape Arctic Power Dynamics: Who Controls the Northern Sea Route?

5 Aug, 2025
| Salome K

Sino-Russian cooperation changes the Arctic playing field

As melting ice offers ever-increasing opportunities, Russia and China are forging a deep strategic alliance around the transformation of the Northern Sea Route (NSR). A coordinated approach that combines economic growth, military interest, and geopolitical tension.

MOSCOW, August 5, 2025 – A maritime crossroads in transformation

In 2024, the first 92 full transit voyages were completed on the Northern Sea Route (NSR), carrying over three million tons of cargo. This was a historic high, underscoring Russia’s ambition to develop the NSR into a full-fledged trade route. In 2025, Russian authorities expect at least one and a half times as many voyages, with 196 requested voyages and a growing number of shipments by foreign carriers. Chinese companies are at the heart of this growth: they plan to significantly expand their supply capacity, including through joint ventures with Rosatom and the Chinese company NewNew Shipping for the construction and operation of ice-class container ships.

Institutionalization of cooperation and digital control

The cooperation received a formal impetus in April 2023, when China and Russia’s FSB Border Guard Service signed a memorandum on closer maritime cooperation. This includes coordination of patrols, surveillance systems, anti-smuggling operations, and data exchange. In May 2024, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin established a special NSR subcommittee, focusing on joint planning of cargo volumes, logistics, and scientific data processing. This established a robust framework for future surveillance, including dual-use infrastructure such as data cables and maritime monitoring platforms. Key components, such as the Polar Express submarine cable, give China a structural role in the NSR’s digital backbone.

Military exercises and strategic dependence

The increasing cooperation is also visible in the military sphere. In September 2024, Chinese submarines conducted exercises under Arctic ice, while strategic bombers flew joint patrols over the Bering Strait during the Ocean 24 exercise . Analyses by the Washington-based think tank Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), which specializes in transatlantic relations, among other things, indicate that these exercises are not merely symbolic. They constitute pilot projects for a future joint operational presence, with implications for undersea infrastructure such as data cables and energy supply.

While Russia is realizing its Arctic ambitions with this cooperation, its dependence on foreign partners is also growing. President Putin confirmed in March 2025 that Russia is actively inviting international investors, including China and the Gulf States, to develop port infrastructure, icebreakers, and shipping capacity in Murmansk and other locations. This provides capital, technology, and logistical advantages, but simultaneously increases the risk of a creeping erosion of Russian autonomy over vital maritime routes.

Since 2020, the number of Chinese companies in the NSR region has risen from 48 to 123 in the first half of 2023, with further growth expected in 2025. At the same time, China is investing billions in local infrastructure and maintains significant interests in strategic LNG projects such as Yamal LNG and Arctic LNG 2. In 2024, NewNew Shipping announced a $2.5 billion expansion of new container services and port capacity. This economic interconnectedness places Russia in a position of mutual dependence, but the balance is increasingly tilted toward Chinese influence.

Legal implications and sovereignty issues

The rise of joint Sino-Russian activities along the NSR has significant legal implications, both under international maritime law and Russian domestic legislation. The Northern Sea Route largely passes through Russia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and territorial waters, but falls under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Russia invokes Article 234 of UNCLOS, which allows states to apply stricter rules in ice-covered sea areas, while Western countries emphasize principles such as innocent passage and transit passage , now that the NSR is ice-free for increasingly longer periods due to climate change.

The memoranda with China introduce a new legal layer: the 2023 MOU formally grants China a role in maritime enforcement, and the 2024 NSR subcommittee provides for joint planning and digital monitoring. This effectively gives China a co-regulatory role in Russian waters. This shared operational control could complicate Russian sovereignty claims, especially if future arbitrations or international incidents arise.

Moreover, the practice clashes with Russia’s 2012 NSR law (last amended in 2024), which stipulates that all foreign vessels require a license and that data infrastructure must remain under Russian control. In reality, Chinese partners operate crucial logistical and digital links. Western legal experts warn that these gray areas create room for contestation, for example, within the Arctic Council or through US Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs).

A shared corridor with geopolitical tension

By 2025, the Northern Sea Route will no longer be an exclusive Russian asset, but a strategic corridor under shared control with China. The economic benefits for Moscow are considerable, but the legal and geopolitical costs are increasing. China is gaining structural influence in Russian waters, while the West is strengthening its military and legal instruments. Since 2024, NATO and the United States have considered the close cooperation between Russia and China in the Arctic a primary security threat. Norway and other NATO member states are intensifying Arctic training and modernizing their infrastructure in Scandinavia and the Polish Corridor. Simultaneously, Western states are preparing a legal framework to enforce freer passage through the Northern Sea Route, citing precedents such as Canada’s Northwest Passage.

The future of the NSR will depend on the delicate balance between economic cooperation, sovereign control, and the increasing potential for geopolitical confrontation in the High North.