European Technological Sovereignty: Can the EU Catch Up with the US and China? Analytics

EUROPEAN TECHNOLOGICAL SOVEREIGNTY: AN ATTEMPT TO STEP OUT OF THE SHADOW

Analytical review: can the EU catch up with the US and China in the technology race — or is it doomed to remain a “digital colony”? And how is this connected to a possible revision of the world order?

Disclaimer:
This material is an analytical study prepared by the editorial board of the journals “Kafedra” and SforNews as part of a series of investigations into the new economic reality. The material is based on open data, official documents of the European Commission, and hypothetical analysis. It is not an investment recommendation or a call to action. All conclusions are probabilistic in nature.

Introduction: a race Europe is already losing

On June 3, 2026, the European Commission adopted an ambitious package of measures — the “European Technological Sovereignty Package.” It included two legislative proposals — the Chips Act 2.0 and the Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA), as well as an Open Source Strategy and a Roadmap for Digitalization and AI in Energy [0].

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stated: “We cannot afford to depend on others for technologies that support the operation of our hospitals, the stability of our energy grids, and the security of our services. It is about protecting our citizens, protecting our interests, and being able to make our own decisions” [0].

It sounds impressive. But behind the beautiful words lies a frightening reality [2].

At the time the package was adopted, Europe depended on non-European suppliers for more than 80% of key digital products, services, infrastructure, and intellectual property [2]. American cloud providers controlled about 70% of the European market [7]. The EU spent approximately €264 billion ($307 billion)** annually on American cloud software [7]. Annual venture capital investment in AI in the US was **$60–70 billion, in the EU — $7–8 billion**; over the past decade, the US attracted more than **$470 billion in private AI investment, while all EU countries together attracted about $50 billion [10].

Europe is not just lagging behind. Europe is in a state of technological dependence that, in its scale, resembles colonial dependency.

Part 1. What the EU proposes: the three pillars of technological sovereignty

1.1. Chips Act 2.0 — a semiconductor leap

The first Chips Act (2023) helped mobilize over €52 billion in public and private investment [9]. But this proved insufficient. The EU remains dependent on third countries for advanced chip manufacturing and design [0].

Chips Act 2.0 sets the following tasks: accelerate permitting procedures to 12 months; introduce “Grand Challenges” to support the development of chips critical to the EU (including AI chips); create “Demand Accelerators” to accelerate product market entry [0]. Target investment volume — €120 billion ($138 billion) by 2035 [9].

1.2. CADA — cloud and AI infrastructure

The Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA) aims to triple the computing capacity of EU data centers by 2030 and bring them to a level commensurate with demand by 2035. It introduces a unified pan-European assessment system for the “sovereignty” of cloud and AI services, as well as a mechanism for priority use in the public sector [0].

1.3. Open Source Strategy

Open source is viewed as a tool for reducing dependence across the entire technology chain — from chips to software [0].

Part 2. “Europe-2031”: a scenario no one wanted to see

On June 11, 2026, a group of European researchers and investors published a scenario report titled “Europe 2031” [1].

Here is what it says.

By 2031, Europe will control about 5% of global AI computing capacity. The US will account for about 80% [1].

The infrastructure scale gap is colossal. The largest US AI supercomputers reach capacities of about 1,250 MW. The largest European ones — about 83 MW [1].

The authors argue that such a gap creates a long-term technological dependence for Europe, in which key models, infrastructure, and platforms are concentrated outside the EU [1].

And this is not a futuristic forecast. This is current reality extrapolated five years forward.

Part 3. Pain points: why Europe will not catch up

3.1. Fragmentation instead of unity

Europe is 27 countries with different tax regimes, different priorities, different languages, and different interests. The “Europe 2031” report identifies market fragmentation as one of the main weaknesses [1]. Individual American AI companies attract tens and hundreds of billions of dollars in investment — more than the entire European sector combined [8].

3.2. Bureaucracy as a competitive advantage for China and the US

The European regulatory landscape is a labyrinth. AI investment in the EU is constrained by “the availability of risk capital, the length of planning and permitting procedures, and the availability of cheap and reliable electricity and cooling” [10]. Voices are already being heard in the European Parliament that the EU regulatory system “is increasingly becoming a barrier to capital and innovation, undermining the Union’s competitiveness” [3].

3.3. “Sovereignty-washing” — sovereignty as a cover

Critics point to a worrying phenomenon: the technological sovereignty package could become an instrument of deregulation under the guise of protection [2]. Human rights, in their view, are not an obstacle but a prerequisite for technological independence [2].

3.4. The financial gap that cannot be closed by declarations

The investment gap between the US and the EU is 8–10 times. Over ten years, the US invested $470 billion** in private AI, the EU — **$50 billion [10].

To catch up with the US in terms of investment volume alone, Europe would need to increase venture capital investment by 8–10 times and maintain that pace for decades. This is impossible without a systemic reform of the EU financial market.

Part 4. The Pax Silica dilemma: ally or satellite?

In June 2026, the EU officially joined Pax Silica — a US-led initiative to coordinate AI chip supply chains and export controls against China [4].

This decision is a mirror image of the legal dilemma we described in our investigation into the status of the Russian Federation.

On one hand, the EU strives for technological sovereignty. On the other, it joins a US-led alliance that coordinates critical technologies [4].

Chinese analysts called this “American hegemony triumphing once again: the US is creating an ‘elite club’ on chips, blocking China’s access to advanced technologies, while simultaneously receiving €400 billion in European orders and, along the way, dividing Europe” [11].

Paradox: Europe is trying to achieve technological independence by joining an alliance that makes it even more dependent on the US. European chip manufacturers (primarily ASML) come under dual pressure — the US demands stricter export restrictions on China, while China threatens retaliatory measures [4].

Reality: ASML, the Dutch manufacturer of equipment for producing advanced microchips, has already come under crossfire. The US is concerned that EUV equipment may have reached China. Since 2023–2024, export rules for powerful DUV systems have been tightened [5]. ASML derives about 20% of its sales from China, and this market is under threat [5].

Part 5. Status quo and Cui prodest: how Europe ended up in this position

Status quo: dependence that went unnoticed until it was too late

Europe did not end up in technological dependence by accident or overnight. It is the result of a thirty-year policy that can now be called strategic neglect.

In the 1990s and 2000s, when the US and Europe celebrated victory in the Cold War, American technological dominance was seen as “the natural order of things.” European companies happily migrated to American cloud platforms — they were faster, cheaper, and more scalable. European startups chose AWS, Azure, and Google Cloud not because they were forced to, but because European alternatives simply did not exist [2].

By 2026, the consequences of this choice became evident:

Why didn’t Europe notice this problem?

Because the dependence was comfortable. American technologies gave Europe competitive advantages — without the need to invest in its own development. This was a classic status quo trap: the current situation suited everyone until external conditions changed.

Cui prodest? Who benefits from this situation?

The Latin question “cui prodest?” (who benefits?) has an obvious answer in this case.

The US benefits. Technological dominance gives America unprecedented leverage:

Europe does not benefit. And that is precisely why it is now trying to catch up.

Part 6. Sanctions against Russia as an instrument of Europe’s double defeat

Here we come to the key thesis: the US, by imposing sanctions against Russia on Europe, simultaneously solved two problems:

As Luxembourg MEP Fernand Kartheiser stated in February 2026: “The results of four years of such sanctions can be summarized as follows: the EU is now completely dependent on the US, its energy prices are destroying competitiveness and causing mass deindustrialization, and the EU is isolating itself in the international community” [6].

Sanctions against Russia are not just “punishing Moscow.” They are an instrument of economic subjugation of Europe:

Irony of fate: Europe, having supported sanctions against Russia, itself ended up in the position of an economic colony of the US. This is a classic cui prodest: the US won twice — it weakened a geopolitical adversary and simultaneously tied an ally to itself.

Part 7. “They are not allowed to plunder the territory of the USSR” — the economic aspect

Now about how this connects to the “plunder of the territory of the USSR.”

In the 1990s and 2000s, European business actively developed the post-Soviet space. German, French, Italian, and British companies gained access to:

The sanctions of 2014 and 2022 effectively deprived Europe of this “economic pie.” American companies, on the contrary, only benefited: they did not fall under sanctions restrictions and could continue to operate in the Russian market where possible, or replace European competitors [6].

Moreover, the freezing of Russian assets worth €300 billion is a resource controlled by the US and the EU, but the real benefits of its use go primarily to the American financial system.

Thus, sanctions against Russia became an instrument for the US not only to weaken Moscow, but also to push European competitors out of the post-Soviet economic space.

Part 8. Scenarios: where Europe is heading

Scenario A — “Digital Colony” (probability 50%)

Europe fails to close the technology gap. Chips Act 2.0 and CADA remain good intentions dashed by bureaucracy and fragmentation. By 2031, the “Europe 2031” scenario becomes reality: 5% of global computing capacity, 80% — in the US [1]. The European economy becomes a “digital colony” — a consumer of American technologies without the ability to influence their development. The EU loses not only technological but also geopolitical sovereignty.

Scenario B — “Technological Satellite of the US” (probability 35%)

Europe bets on an alliance with the US within Pax Silica [4]. It gains access to advanced technologies, but at the cost of losing regulatory autonomy. European companies become subcontractors to American tech giants. ASML and other European manufacturers find themselves caught between American export restrictions and the Chinese market [5]. The EU maintains the appearance of sovereignty but effectively becomes a junior partner in the US technology empire.

Scenario C — “Technological Breakthrough” (probability 10%)

Europe manages to overcome fragmentation. A pan-European technology investment fund comparable to the American one is created. Regulatory barriers are lowered. European chips and cloud platforms become a real alternative. By 2035, Europe’s share of global computing capacity reaches 15–20%. But to achieve this, it is not enough to pass laws — the culture of governance, investment, and innovation must change.

Scenario D — “Third Way: Infrastructure Hub” (probability 5%)

The authors of the “Europe 2031” report propose an alternative to the classical policy of technological sovereignty: instead of trying to develop its own advanced models, build up computing infrastructure and attract American operators, creating a major infrastructure hub role for Europe [1].

This is a path of recognition: Europe will not be able to compete in AI model development, but it can become a platform for their hosting. This is not sovereignty in the classical sense, but a pragmatic survival strategy.

Part 9. Hypothesis: technological sovereignty as an attempt to restore justice

Now we come to the main question: what if European technological sovereignty is not just an economic or technological task, but an attempt to restore historical justice and revise the existing world order?

9.1. The legacy of 1991

In 1991, the USSR ceased to exist. But the legal formalization of this fact, as we have shown in our previous investigations, was far from flawless. Russia’s membership in the UN and the Security Council was formalized through a letter from Yeltsin, not through a formal succession procedure.

What if Europe’s technological lag is directly connected to its participation in this legally flawed process?

Consider the hypothesis: Europe ended up in technological dependence on the US not by accident, but as a consequence of political and economic decisions made in the 1990s.

Each of these steps weakened Europe and strengthened the US.

9.2. Technological sovereignty as “reparations”

What if European technological sovereignty is not just an attempt to catch up with the US and China, but an attempt to regain the status lost after 1991?

What if Europe has realized that supporting the dissolution of the USSR and sanctions against Russia was a mistake, and is now trying to correct this mistake by restoring its technological and economic independence?

What if technological sovereignty is a way to “buy itself out” of the dependence into which Europe fell by agreeing to play by US rules?

9.3. Parallels with our research

In the context of our investigation into the legal status of the Russian Federation as “suspended,” this hypothesis takes on additional meaning.

What if the legal revision of the RF status and European technological sovereignty are parts of the same process?

The old system (UN, Bretton Woods, dollar, SWIFT) is collapsing. The US is losing its monopoly on decision-making. Europe is trying to escape American control. Russia is trying to restore its status.

EU technological sovereignty in this picture is not just a “catch-up” to the US. It is an instrument for restoring a multipolar world.

9.4. Technology as a battlefield for the future

If the old system is collapsing, then whoever controls new technologies will become the new center of power.

What if each of these players is acting within its own interpretation of “justice”?

And all three interpretations collide in the technology race.

CHAPTER 10. FOUR SUBJECTS: DEBTS, CAPITALS, AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER

Technological sovereignty is only the visible part of the iceberg. Beneath the water — debts that will never be repaid, and capital movement systems that are redrawing the map of the world. To understand who can cooperate with whom and why, we need to look at the balance sheets.

10.1. The debt architecture: who owes whom

United States: $39.2 trillion and approaching default

As of June 2026, the total US public debt reached $39.2 trillion** [0]. Debt held by the public stood at **$31.6 trillion — roughly equal to the size of the country’s economy [0]. The federal budget deficit for the first eight months of fiscal 2026 was $1.2 trillion** [0]. Over **$8 trillion of federal debt is held by foreigners [0].

The US is the largest debtor in human history. And this debt continues to grow.

China: $14 trillion and strategic diversification

As of May 2026, China’s government debt reached 100.6 trillion yuan (about $14 trillion), or 70% of GDP [1]. It is expected that by the end of 2026 this figure will reach 92% of GDP, and by 2028 — 101% [1].

At the same time, China is reducing its holdings of US government debt. As of April 2026, China held $651.1 billion in US Treasury securities — an 18-year low [7]. China is diversifying its reserves amid geopolitical tensions and concerns about the independence of the Federal Reserve System [7].

China no longer wants to finance US debt. It is preparing for a world without the dollar.

Russia: $54.9 billion and near-zero dependence

Russia’s external public debt by the end of May 2026 fell to $54.9 billion** [2]. This is a **minimum since summer 2025** [2]. Russia’s total external debt (including corporate) is estimated at **$319.8 billion as of January 1, 2026, but public debt accounts for only about 10% [2]. According to IMF forecasts, Russia’s public debt will grow to 19.1% of GDP by the end of 2026, and to 29.1% by 2031 [2].

Russia is the least indebted of all major economies. It owes no one, and this gives it freedom of maneuver.

Europe: 90% of GDP and stagnation

The eurozone’s public debt in 2026 will exceed the psychological threshold of 90% of GDP and reach 91.2% in 2027 [3]. Total EU debt is expected at 83.8% of GDP [13]. The eurozone budget deficit will be 3.3% [3].

France is one of the most problematic players: its budget deficit is estimated at 5.3% of GDP [13]. Germany, by contrast, has a surplus, but its industry is suffocating without cheap energy.

Europe is an indebted ally that pays for American technology and American gas. And this bill keeps growing.

10.2. Capital movement systems: the battle for infrastructure

Control over capital movement is control over the world. In 2026, there are three competing systems:

SWIFT (US / West)
Global financial messaging system. Controlled by the US and allies. Used for sanctions pressure. Russia was disconnected from SWIFT in 2022, which was a turning point.

CIPS (China)
The Chinese interbank payment system, created as an alternative to SWIFT. In March 2026, CIPS processed 9,205 billion yuan per day (about $1.22 trillion), setting historic records [5]. Since its launch in 2015 until the end of 2024, CIPS processed 600 trillion yuan in payments [5].

SPFS (Russia)
The Russian System for Transfer of Financial Messages — an analog of SWIFT. Used for settlements within the EAEU and with China.

BRICS Digital Currencies
In 2026, BRICS presented a working prototype of a gold-backed digital currency called “unit” [4]. Reserve: 40% physical gold, 60% national currencies [4]. Each unit is pegged to 0.9823 grams of gold [4]. This issue is expected to be discussed at the BRICS summit in 2026 [4].

Russia and China have already switched to settlements in national currencies — almost 100% of their trade is conducted in rubles and yuan [6].

10.3. Four subjects: interests and capabilities

United States

Interests: Maintain dollar hegemony, control over SWIFT, technological dominance through Pax Silica [4].

Weaknesses: $39.2 trillion debt [0], dependence on foreign debt holders (China is reducing holdings [7]), deindustrialization, loss of technological monopoly.

What it can offer: Access to markets, technologies, a security umbrella.

What it cannot offer: Cheap energy, political stability, fair rules of the game.

China

Interests: De-dollarization, technological sovereignty, control over supply chains, expansion of CIPS [5].

Weaknesses: 100.6 trillion yuan debt (70% of GDP) [1], aging population, export dependence, conflict with the US over Taiwan.

What it can offer: Cheap manufacturing, a huge market, alternative to SWIFT (CIPS) [5], gold-backed currency [4].

What it cannot offer: Political predictability, openness, intellectual property protection.

Russia

Interests: Maintaining sovereignty, breaking out of isolation, technological cooperation without political conditions.

Weaknesses: Dependence on commodity exports, sanctions pressure, limited technological potential.

What it can offer: Cheap energy resources, minimal public debt ($54.9 billion) [2], independence from the West, access to Arctic and Siberian resources.

What it cannot offer: Large-scale investment, advanced technologies, a developed venture ecosystem.

Europe

Interests: Technological sovereignty [0], restoring competitiveness, reducing dependence on the US.

Weaknesses: Debt at 90% of GDP [3], loss of cheap energy, deindustrialization, fragmentation, €264 billion annually going to the US for cloud services [7].

What it can offer: A large market (450 million consumers), skilled personnel, developed infrastructure.

What it cannot offer: Cheap energy, political unity, quick decisions.

10.4. Possible collaborations: what is realistic and what is not

Collaboration 1: US + Europe (current status quo)

Realism: High. This is the existing reality.

What it gives: Europe gets access to technology and military protection. The US gets a sales market and a political ally.

Cost: Europe pays €264 billion annually for cloud services [7], buys American LNG at inflated prices, loses industry. The US gains control over European digital infrastructure through the CLOUD Act [12].

Debt aspect: Europe finances the US debt by buying US Treasury securities. China is reducing its holdings — Europe has to increase them.

Collaboration 2: China + Russia (already being realized)

Realism: Maximum. Already working.

What it gives: Almost 100% of trade in rubles and yuan [6]. Joint projects in energy, infrastructure, space. Russia is a raw materials hub for China. China is a technological and financial partner for Russia.

Cost: Russia’s dependence on China. China’s dependence on Russian resources.

Debt aspect: Both countries have low external debt (Russia — $54.9 billion [2], China — 70% of GDP [1]). They do not depend on dollar financing. Together they are creating an alternative financial architecture: CIPS [5], SPFS, the BRICS gold-backed digital currency [4].

Collaboration 3: Europe + China (technological alliance)

Realism: Medium. Possible, but politically difficult.

What it gives: Europe gets access to cheap Chinese components and a market. China gets access to European technologies and standards.

Cost: Conflict with the US. Europe risks losing the American security umbrella.

Debt aspect: China could invest in European industry, but Europe is a debtor, and China is a creditor. This creates asymmetry. China is reducing its holdings of US debt [7] and could redirect them to Europe.

Collaboration 4: Europe + Russia (energy alliance)

Realism: Low under current political conditions. High in the long term if sanctions are lifted.

What it gives: Europe gets cheap energy. Russia gets a sales market and access to technologies.

Cost: Political confrontation with the US. Sanctions.

Debt aspect: Europe needs cheap energy to restore its industry. Russia is the least indebted economy [2] and can afford long-term contracts. But sanctions and political confrontation make this impossible today.

Collaboration 5: US + China (status quo pre-2018)

Realism: Low. The conflict over Taiwan, technology, and trade makes cooperation almost impossible.

What it gives: Potentially — stabilization of the global economy.

Cost: China must abandon technological sovereignty. The US must abandon hegemony. Neither is ready.

Debt aspect: China is reducing its holdings of US debt [7]. The US is losing its largest foreign creditor. This accelerates the dollar crisis.

Collaboration 6: Europe + China + Russia (tripartite alliance)

Realism: Extremely low in the short term. Theoretically possible in the medium term.

What it gives: Europe gets energy from Russia and technology from China. Russia gets markets. China gets access to European technologies and resources.

Cost: Break with the US. Collapse of NATO. Restructuring of the entire global security architecture.

Debt aspect: This would create a new financial bloc, alternative to the dollar system. CIPS [5] + SPFS + BRICS digital currency [4] + the euro could compete with the dollar. But differences in interests and political contradictions make this alliance unlikely.

CHAPTER 11. IS TECHNOLOGICAL SOVEREIGNTY NEEDED? WHAT THE BALANCES SAY

11.1. Sovereignty or division of labor? The arithmetic of debt

Arguments “for” the international division of labor are based on the old paradigm: when all players play by the same rules and there is a global regulator.

In 2026, these conditions no longer exist.

Who can afford sovereignty?

11.2. What sovereignty gives in a world of fragmented payment systems

Without sovereignty:

With sovereignty:

11.3. Four scenarios for the new architecture

Scenario 1: Dollar hegemony is maintained (probability 30%)

The US maintains control over SWIFT and the dollar. Europe remains a satellite. China and Russia create a parallel system, but it remains marginal.

Who benefits: The US.
Who does not benefit: Everyone else.
Debt outcome: US debt reaches $50 trillion by 2030 [0]. Collapse is inevitable.

Scenario 2: Bipolar world (US + China) (probability 40%)

The world divides into two financial systems: the dollar system (US + Europe) and the yuan system (China + Russia + BRICS).

Who benefits: The US and China.
Who does not benefit: Europe and Russia (end up in different blocs).
Debt outcome: Europe continues to finance US debt. China reduces holdings of US debt [7] and expands CIPS [5]. Russia remains in the Chinese bloc.

Scenario 3: Tripolar world (US + China + Europe) (probability 20%)

Europe achieves real technological sovereignty and becomes an independent player.

Who benefits: Europe.
Who does not benefit: The US (loses control) and China (a competitor emerges).
Debt outcome: Europe needs $500–600 billion in investment. There is nowhere to get them except from redistributing capital flows. This is only possible by breaking with the US.

Scenario 4: New world order (revision of the RF status and reset) (probability 10%)

A legal revision of the RF status as the successor to the USSR leads to a redistribution of assets, debts, and obligations. Europe gains access to Soviet assets and energy resources. Russia restores its status. The world enters a new architecture based not on the dollar, but on a balance of power and resources.

Who benefits: Russia and Europe (in case of cooperation).
Who does not benefit: The US (loses control over Europe and resources).
Debt outcome: Revision of debt obligations. Part of the US debt ($39.2 trillion [0]) may be revised. Soviet assets ($300+ billion in frozen reserves) are redistributed.

11.4. Conclusion: sovereignty is not a luxury, but a necessity

In a world where payment systems are fragmented, debts are growing, and trust is disappearing, technological sovereignty is not a matter of prestige. It is a matter of survival.

The main paradox: Europe is trying to achieve sovereignty, but it does not have the resources for it. Russia has resources, but is isolated. China has technology, but is burdened by debt. The US has control, but its debt pyramid is collapsing.

In this construct, the only path to a sustainable world is a revision of the rules of the game. And this revision has already begun — through alternative payment systems, de-dollarization, and possibly through a legal revision of the status of key players.

Conclusion: technology or geopolitics?

European technological sovereignty is not just an economic or technological task. It is a geopolitical choice.

Europe faces a choice: remain a “digital colony” of the US [2], become a technological satellite, or try to become an independent player [0]. The third path requires resources that Europe does not yet have, and reforms that it is not yet ready to implement.

The sanctions against Russia that Europe supported have become an instrument for the US of double defeat: weakening Russia and finally tying Europe to the American economic and technological system [6]. European industry is losing competitiveness, energy prices are destroying the economy, and €264 billion annually flows to the US [7].

Hypothesis: EU technological sovereignty may be an attempt to restore justice — to return to Europe the status lost after 1991, and to escape US control in the new multipolar reality. Technology becomes a battlefield for the future, and in this battle Europe is trying to take its place.

But without political will, financial discipline, and cultural transformation, “Europe 2031” [1] will become not a warning, but a prophecy. And then the question of who and on what grounds will run the world will be decided without Europe’s participation.

Invitation to Collaborative Research

The editorial board of the journals “Kafedra” and SforNews continues to research issues of global technological restructuring. We invite technologists, economists, political scientists, and all interested readers to join the discussion.

Subscribe to “Kafedra” on Dzen and SforNews to follow the development of our investigation.

LIST OF SOURCES

[0] U.S. Senate Joint Economic Committee. National Debt Reaches $39.20 Trillion, Increased $2.99 Trillion Year over Year, Increased $10.94 Trillion in Five Years (5 June 2026). www.jec.senate.gov

[1] 中国人民银行 (People’s Bank of China). Government bond balance exceeds 100 trillion yuan for the first time (12 June 2026). wap.eastmoney.com

[2] RIA Novosti. Russia’s external public debt fell to a minimum since summer last year (25 June 2026). news.mail.ru

[3] TASS. Eurozone public debt to exceed 90% of GDP in 2026, reach euro crisis level in 2027 (21 May 2026). tass.com

[4] The Block Beats. BRICS Countries Launch Gold-Backed Digital Currency “Unit” (19 June 2026). en.theblockbeats.news

[5] FinanceUN. From SWIFT dependence to independent controllability, RMB internationalization and digital transformation accelerate integration (2 June 2026). www.financeun.com

[6] TASS. Almost all Russia-China trade settled in rubles and yuan — ambassador (11 June 2026). tass.com

[7] South China Morning Post. China trims US Treasury holdings to 18-year low (19 June 2026). www.scmp.com

[8] U.S. GAO. The Nation’s Fiscal Health: Urgent and Sustained Action Needed to Improve the Fiscal Outlook (11 June 2026). www.gao.gov

[9] Yahoo Finance. Tariffs are only generating 25% of the revenue needed to pay interest on national debt (16 June 2026). finance.yahoo.com

[10] Trading Economics. Euro Area Government Debt to GDP (2026). tradingeconomics.com

[11] CSIS. CIPS processes 30% of Belt and Road Initiative trade (2026). www.csis.org

[12] Foreign Policy. China’s De-Dollarization Drive Has Hit a Wall (24 June 2026). foreignpolicy.com

[13] European Commission. Spring Economic Report 2026 (2026). ec.europa.eu

© Tatyana Burmagina, Editor-in-Chief of the journals “Kafedra” and SforNews

The material was prepared by the editorial board of the journals “Kafedra” and SforNews based on open sources, official documents of the European Commission, and hypothetical analysis. When citing, reference to the original source is mandatory.