EU Energy Security: From Russian Dependence to American Dependence – 2026 Analysis

1 Jul, 2026
| Salome K

EU ENERGY SECURITY: FROM RUSSIAN DEPENDENCE TO AMERICAN DEPENDENCE

Disclaimer:
This material is an analytical study prepared by the editorial board of Kafedra and SforNews magazines as part of a series of investigations into the new economic reality. It is based on open data, official documents, and hypothetical analysis. It does not constitute investment advice or a call to action. All conclusions are probabilistic in nature.

Introduction

Europe risks facing a gas deficit in the coming heating season. According to forecasts from consultancy Wood Mackenzie, by the end of October 2026, European gas storage facilities will be only 76% full [1][2] – the lowest level since at least 2011 [2]. The Financial Times describes this situation as “the lowest gas inventories in 15 years” [2].

At the root of the crisis lie three systemic factors: the conflict in the Strait of Hormuz, which is blocking LNG supplies from the Middle East; the EU’s complete ban on Russian gas imports from 2027; and Europe’s rapidly growing dependence on US LNG, whose share has already reached 64% [3][4][5].

1. Retrospective: How Europe Depended on Russian Gas

Supply Volumes
Until 2022, Russia was Europe’s largest gas supplier. In 2021, on the eve of the invasion of Ukraine, Russian pipeline gas accounted for about 40% of European imports [7]. Russian LNG added another 4–5%. Together – almost half of all gas consumed by the EU.

The supply structure looked as follows:

• Pipeline gas from Russia – the bulk (about 155 billion cubic metres per year)

• Norwegian gas – the second largest supplier

• LNG from Qatar, the US, Nigeria – supplemented the balance

Prices
Gas prices in Europe before 2021 were stable and relatively low. The average annual TTF price (the Dutch hub, the main benchmark for Europe) in 2020 was about €11–12 per MWh [8].

Settlements
Most payments for Russian gas were made in euros and US dollars. Contracts were predominantly long-term, linked to oil prices (the “oil + lag” formula). Payments went through SWIFT, and funds were credited via European and Russian correspondent banks. Currency structure: approximately 60% in euros, 30% in dollars, 10% in other currencies.

2. 2022–2025: Shock and Restructuring

Collapse of Supplies
After the war in Ukraine began (February 2022), pipeline gas supplies from Russia started to decline sharply. By the end of 2022, Nord Stream was blown up, transit through Ukraine was reduced, and supplies via TurkStream remained the only route [8].

Price Peak
Prices soared to historic highs. In August 2022, TTF reached €342 per MWh [8]. That was 30 times higher than the 2020 level. European businesses shut down, and households received bills in the tens of thousands of euros.

Replacing Russian Gas
Europe began an emergency replacement of Russian gas [8]:

• US LNG – the main beneficiary. In 2022–2023, supplies multiplied.

• LNG from Qatar – part of the volumes were redirected to Europe.

• Algeria and Norway – increased pipeline supplies.

3. 2026: The New Reality

The Hormuz Crisis
On 28 February 2026, the war between the US and Israel against Iran began [6]. The nearcomplete closure of the Strait of Hormuz halted about 20% of global LNG trade [3]. Supplies from Qatar and the UAE – key LNG suppliers to Europe – were virtually blocked [3].

Average European prices rose by about €10 per MWh (roughly 31%) since the start of the conflict [8]. The total gas bill for the 27 EU countries in 2026 increased by 48% [3].

Ban on Russian Gas
On 26 January 2026, the EU Council formally approved a complete ban on Russian gas imports [7]:

• LNG from Russia – banned from 1 January 2027 [7]

• Pipeline gas – banned from 30 September 2027 [7]

At the time of the ban, Russian LNG accounted for about 14% of total LNG supplies to Europe [7].

Storage Refill
After the cold winter of 2025/2026, European storage started the refill season at only 28% [1]. By June 2026, they are on average 48% full – the lowest level in 15 years [1][2].

The injection process is slow because high summer prices do not incentivise companies to replenish stocks [1].

4. Prices: Retrospective and Current Levels

Period	TTF Price (€/MWh)	Note
2020 (annual average)	~€11–12 [8]	Precrisis level
August 2022 (peak)	€342 [8]	Alltime high
2024 (annual average)	~€30–35	Postcrisis stabilisation
February 2026 (before the war)	~€35–38 [8]	Before the Hormuz crisis
March–April 2026	~€45–55 [8]	Rise after the war began
June 2026	~€40 [8]	Relative stabilisation

Key nuance: Even at the current €40 per MWh, prices remain 3–4 times higher than in 2020 and 8 times higher than the average for the 2010s [8].

Goldman Sachs in March 2026 revised its Q2 2026 TTF forecast to €72 per MWh [8]. If restrictions in the Strait of Hormuz persist for 10 weeks, summer prices could exceed €89 per MWh [8].

5. Flows: Who Replaced Russia

US Share – Record Growth
The structure of LNG imports to Europe has radically changed [3][5][7]:

Period	US share in EU LNG imports
2021	~10% [7]
2025	57% [5]
January–April 2026 (average)	59% [5]
April 2026 (peak)	64% [4]

According to the European Commission, in April 2026, LNG imports from the US reached a record 7.8 billion cubic metres [4]. However, total EU LNG imports fell to 11.6 billion cubic metres (1 billion less than the previous month) due to the loss of Qatari volumes as a result of the Hormuz crisis [4].

Total EU gas imports (LNG + pipeline) in May 2026 amounted to 24 billion cubic metres – within seasonal norms [4].

Critical threshold: In global commodity markets, a share above 30–40% is considered a warning signal, and above 60% is a zone of extreme risk [4]. Europe has already exceeded thisthreshold.

Other Suppliers

• Algeria and Nigeria – increased supplies, but their capacities are limited [8]

• Qatar and the UAE – supplies virtually halted due to the Hormuz crisis [3]

• Russia – supplies continue until 2027, but have already been reduced; in January–May 2026, Russian LNG imports rose by about 17%, as Europe frontloaded purchases before the ban [7]

6. Settlements: How the Currency Structure Changed

Before 2022

• Euro – ~60% of gas payments

• US dollar – ~30%

• Roubles – less than 1% (mostly in contracts with small traders)

2022–2025

• Russia introduced a requirement to pay for gas in roubles (“gas for roubles“). Some European companies (mainly from Hungary, Slovakia, Bulgaria) switched to rouble settlements via special accounts at Gazprombank [8].

• Most Western companies stopped purchases or switched to LNG contracts in dollars and euros.

2026

• The dollar’s share in gas payments has grown significantly – US LNG supplies are denominated in US dollars.

• The euro’s share has shrunk – major contracts with the US, Qatar, and other suppliers are concluded in dollars.

• The rouble’s share is minimal; by 2027, after the full ban on Russian gas, it will virtually disappear.

• China and Turkey use national currencies in gas payments with Russia, but this is not relevant for Europe.

Conclusion: Europe, having abandoned Russian gas, simultaneously shifted from euroroublesettlements to predominantly dollardenominated ones. This strengthens the dollar’s position in global energy and reduces the euro’s role as a reserve currency.

7. Key Risks

🔴 RISK 1: Gas deficit in winter 2026/2027
With storage at 76% (instead of the targeted 90%), the risk of a deficit during peak freezing temperatures is extremely high [1][2]. The European Commission has already lowered the target filling level to 75–80%, acknowledging the impossibility of reaching previous levels [2].

🔴 RISK 2: Rising prices for consumers
The Financial Times warns: low stock levels “threaten to drive up prices for both businesses and EU citizens this winter” [2]. Goldman Sachs forecasts TTF above €72–89 per MWh if restrictions in the Strait of Hormuz persist [8].

🟡 RISK 3: Gas dependence on the US
Europe has swapped dependence on Russia for dependence on the US [4]. As Bloomberg notes, “Europe has fallen into a rigid gas dependence on the US” [4]. Analysts warn: “replacing dependence on Russian gas with excessive reliance on a single alternative supplier may make Europe vulnerable to future political and market shocks” [4].

🟡 RISK 4: US political pressure
European diplomats and analysts seriously fear that the US could use Brussels’ total energy dependence to advance its own foreign policy interests [4]. The US share in EU LNG imports reached 64% in April 2026 [4], and by the end of the year could exceed twothirds [5].

🟢 RISK 5: Technical vulnerability
Any disruption in the LNG supply chain (hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, accidents at liquefaction plants, problems with regasification terminals in Europe) could lead to an immediate shortage and a new price spike.

8. Scenarios

SCENARIO A – “Cold winter, expensive gas” (Probability 45%)
Storage at 76% [1][2]. A cold winter leads to accelerated depletion of stocks. TTF prices reach €80–100 per MWh [8]. European businesses cut production, households face high bills. Governments introduce subsidies and consumption restrictions.

SCENARIO B – “Hormuz opens, market stabilises” (Probability 30%)
A USIran agreement leads to a gradual restoration of supplies from Qatar and the UAE [3][6]. Prices fall to €50–60 per MWh [8]. Storages fill to 80–82% by November. The crisis eases, but dependence on the US remains high.

SCENARIO C – “Escalation in Hormuz” (Probability 15%)
The conflict in the Strait of Hormuz resumes [6]. LNG supplies from the region are completely blocked for an extended period. Prices spike above €150 per MWh [8]. Europe enters a regime of severe gas austerity. Rolling industrial shutoffs are possible.

SCENARIO D – “Technological breakthrough: renewables and hydrogen” (Probability 10%)
Europe accelerates the transition to renewable energy and hydrogen. Gas demand falls faster than forecast. By 2030, dependence on imported gas falls to historic lows. But this does notmatter for winter 2026/2027.

9. Conclusion

Europe’s energy security in 2026 finds itself in a fragile state:

1. Russian gas is leaving. The ban on Russian LNG imports from 1 January 2027 and on pipeline gas from 30 September 2027 puts an end to the 50year era of RussianEuropean energy relations [7].

2. American gas dominates. The US share in EU LNG imports reached 64% in April 2026 [4], and by the end of the year may exceed twothirds [5]. Dependence on the US has become even tighter than the previous dependence on Russia [4].

3. Prices have risen 3–4 times compared to the precrisis level and remain volatile [8].

4. Settlements have shifted from the eurorouble zone to predominantly dollarbased, reinforcing the dollar’s position in global energy.

5. Risks – winter deficits, price rises, US political pressure, and technical vulnerability make the EU energy system extremely fragile [1][2][4].

Main conclusion: In striving to rid itself of energy dependence on Russia, Europe has fallen into dependence on the US, which in several respects is even tighter. Instead of diversifying suppliers, there has been a concentration – on a single supplier that also uses energy as a foreign policy tool [4].

Sources

[1] Wood Mackenzie – forecast of European gas storage at 76% by October 2026, 29 June 2026
[2] Financial Times – “Europe risks starting winter with gas stocks at 15year low”, 29 June 2026
[3] Investing.com – “The Hormuz crisis did not break Europe’s gas market”, 17 June 2026
[4] Bloomberg – “Europe falls into rigid gas dependence on the US”, 22 June 2026
[5] IEEFA – “Twothirds of LNG imports to Europe will come from the US”, 13 May 2026
[6] REUTERS – “USIran conflict and Strait of Hormuz: impact on global LNG trade”, 2026
[7] TASS – “EU cuts purchases of Russian pipeline gas and LNG by 17% in JanuaryApril”, 15 June 2026
[8] Goldman Sachs / CSD / REKK – analysis of the European gas market after the Hormuz crisis (TTF price forecasts and historical data), March–June 2026
[9] European Commission – Monthly Energy Insights, April–May 2026
[10] RIA Novosti / NTV – “Europe risks starting winter with lowest gas stocks in 15 years”, 29 June 2026