Drones – The Future of Science and Technology | Anatoly Klepov

29 Jan, 2026
| Salome K

I was fortunate to work with a unique Soviet scientist — Mikhail Sergeevich Ryazansky (April 5, 1909 — August 5, 1987), a Soviet scientist and designer in the field of rocket and space technology. Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences (1958). Hero of Socialist Labor (1956). Laureate of the Lenin Prize (1957) and the Stalin Prize, Second Degree (1943).

At that time, I supervised the production of so-called space-grade microcircuits at the USSR Ministry of Electronic Industry.

These were ultra-high-speed, low-power microcircuits capable of withstanding elevated levels of radiation and electromagnetic interference. I used them in the design of my portable encryptors.

They outperformed the best foreign analogues by dozens of times in their parameters. For example, a comparable encryptor from the famous Swiss company Hagelin weighed 2.5 kilograms. My encryptor weighed only 100 grams. Moreover, its encryption speed was dozens of times higher than that of the Swiss analogue. That is what Soviet military electronics meant.

Just before the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, Ryazansky began working in the field of radar, participating in the development of the first Soviet radar system, where he designed its receiving section. He later became the Chief Designer of the P-2 radar, which was adopted for service. Work on the radar, begun in Moscow, continued in Barnaul, where radio specialists had been evacuated.

Ryazansky’s next development was the P-3 guidance radar, followed by the “Biryusa” radar.

At the end of the war, Ryazansky was involved in the study of guidance systems for the V-2 rockets. In 1945–1946, along with many prominent Soviet scientists and designers, he was sent on assignment to Germany, where he studied the developments of German engineers. For this purpose, Soviet engineers established the Nordhausen Institute, where both Soviet and German specialists worked.

Ryazansky also went through the “Nordhausen school” together with Korolev, Glushko, and other future creators of Soviet rocket and space technology. Based on the work of the special commission, a report was issued — the third volume of “Control Systems of German Rockets” — under the leadership of M. S. Ryazansky.

Upon returning to the Soviet Union, he was immediately appointed Chief Designer of NII-885 (now the Federal State Unitary Enterprise Russian Scientific Research Institute of Space Instrumentation), which was engaged in the development of control systems and radio communication equipment for rockets.

He was a member of the “Magnificent Six” of Korolev’s Council of Chief Designers, which made key decisions for the rocket industry. M. S. Ryazansky remained the country’s chief rocket “radio specialist” until the end of his life.

In January 1951, he was appointed Chief Engineer of NII-88 of the Ministry of Armaments, and in the summer of 1952 — Head of the Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Armaments.

Under his leadership, work was carried out to create radio control systems for various types of missile weapons, including long-range ballistic missiles, radio systems for space communications, and control systems for spacecraft serving defense, economic, and scientific purposes. These included space navigation, observation, and long-range deep-space communication systems, which ensured world-class achievements in the exploration of the Moon, Venus, and Mars.

A major contribution was also made to the radio engineering support of manned space flights.

I attended many meetings where the causes of accidents involving space vehicles were analyzed. In most cases, they were the result of incorrect operation of the electronic components of spacecraft.

This was understandable. Enormous overloads during flight, exposure to increased levels of radiation and electromagnetic interference, and many other factors all played a role. Of course, there were additional factors that significantly influenced mission outcomes.

I recall a “debriefing” after a Soviet spacecraft missed its intended target. The investigation lasted a long time, but eventually the cause was identified.

In those days, computer data was stored on magnetic media manufactured by BASF (Germany) and IZOT (Bulgaria). Naturally, the quality of recording and data storage on German media was many times superior to that of Bulgarian products. However, German media had to be purchased with hard currency, which was a serious problem in the USSR.

As a result, programmers more often used IZOT floppy disks for data storage. In one case, data corruption occurred on such a disk, and an unsuspecting programmer uploaded the corrupted software into the spacecraft’s onboard chip.

The consequences were severe. The Soviet spacecraft deviated significantly from its trajectory and was destroyed. I should add that the primary cause of failure of Soviet satellites was often microcircuit malfunction.

In the 1980s, the arms race between the United States and the USSR reached its peak. On March 23, 1983, U.S. President Ronald Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

This was a long-term research and development program whose primary objective was to create a scientific and technical foundation for a large-scale missile defense system with space-based elements, intended to exclude or limit the destruction of ground and naval targets from space.

The foundation of this system was “space electronics,” without which SDI could not function effectively.

In order to divert the USSR onto a false path of military electronics development, the United States allocated $500,000,000 to conduct numerous international conferences and publish scientific papers and studies, aiming to convince the USSR that Integrated Injection Logic (IIL / I²L) — a circuit design and manufacturing technology for logic elements based on bipolar transistors — was superior to CMOS technology.

A group of Soviet scientists from the “Tsiklon” program of the USSR Ministry of Electronic Industry, which included myself, managed to uncover these efforts by Western intelligence services to redirect our electronics industry down the wrong path. We chose the correct direction for the development of Soviet electronics — the more promising, low-power CMOS technology.

I have given just one example of the extraordinary intensity of the struggle for military superiority in the world, especially in missile engineering and space exploration.

Naturally, the use of foreign electronic components in military equipment — including space systems — was strictly prohibited in the USSR. Violations were severely punished, up to imprisonment. As a result, the scientific achievements of Soviet space exploration were the best in the world:

The first spacecraft to reach the surface of another planet was the Soviet station Venera-3, and Venera-7 was the first to transmit data after a soft landing.
The Daytime Probe was the only U.S. descent module that successfully operated on the surface of Venus.
The first soft landing on Mars in history was accomplished by the Soviet descent module of Mars-3 on December 2, 1971.

The list of unique achievements of Soviet science in space exploration is enormous. One of the most critical challenges was always the spacecraft control system under extremely harsh conditions.

MOSCOW, September 24, 2025 / TASS /
Approximately 80% of fire missions in the zone of the special military operation are carried out using unmanned systems, according to Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov.

“The experience of the special military operation has shown that the scale of unmanned systems usage has increased dramatically. In the SVO zone, up to 80% of fire missions are conducted using unmanned systems,” he stated.

Belousov noted that the success of military operations largely depends on the effectiveness of unmanned system control.

“In this regard, improving control systems comes to the forefront. Therefore, these issues have been placed on the agenda of the technical council meeting. Today, we will outline directions for the development of unmanned systems control in both the near and long term,” the minister emphasized.

To create an effective unmanned systems control architecture under conditions of intense enemy interference, it is necessary to use super-intelligent processors and microcircuits, as well as high-capacity, low-weight batteries (the best batteries in the world were used in my encryptors).

Will Russian industry be able to create such microcircuits, without which effective unmanned systems control is impossible? Or will all these decisions remain only on paper?

More details can be found in my book
“Espionage. Encryptors and Chocolate.”