Golden Ruble: How to Save Savings During a Currency Crash and Default

Golden Ruble: How a TwoCircuit Economy Changes the Rules of the Game

The idea of a twocircuit economy and the “Golden Ruble” model is not new. Economists talked about its elements back in the 1990s. The precedent of “Gas for Rubles” in 2022–2026 proved in practice: you can force unfriendly countries to pay for our raw materials on our terms.

The next step is not a temporary manoeuvre, but a systemic reassembly of monetary circulation. To set a notional exchange rate of 1 euro = 1 ruble for domestic settlements, separating the “life circuit” from the “foreign trade circuit”. We can decouple domestic pricing from external markets, ceasing to be hostages of exchange quotations set by someone else’s producers. This is not devaluation and not hyperinflation. It is a return to a simple truth: a country that possesses a full set of resources for survival should not pay for its own labour and its own raw materials at prices set by foreign exchanges.

This article is about money. About how the ruble works today, why it is a hostage of someone else’s game, and how to free it. And about the benefits for everyone — from a supermarket cashier to the owner of a steel mill.

This is a bold but absolutely logical proposal if we really want to move from talking about sovereignty to implementing it.

The proposed model (let’s call it the “Dual Ruble” model) is not about “print money and give it to everyone”. It is about a fair redistribution of resource rent. Its essence is simple: we set a notional exchange rate of 1 euro = 1 ruble for all domestic settlements between Russian residents, decoupling the cost of labour, energy, logistics and raw materials from currency swings.

Here is how it would work in practice, with concrete benefits for each stakeholder.

Part 1. The Dual Ruble: how it works

1.1. Basic principle: two circuits, two modes

The “Dual Ruble” model is based on a simple and transparent rule: all domestic settlements between Russian residents are conducted in rubles at a fixed nominal rate set by the state and independent of exchange rate fluctuations. Notionally — 1 euro = 1 ruble (or 1 dollar = 1 ruble). The choice of parity is secondary; the principle itself is important: the state tells its citizens and businesses: “Inside the country you pay and receive money at this rate. It is backed by our entire economy — energy, food, land, labour, infrastructure.”

The second circuit is external. Exporters sell goods abroad at market prices, receiving revenue in freely convertible currency (dollars, euros, yuan). This revenue goes to special accounts and can be used for:

• purchasing critical imports (medicines, equipment, technologies that we do not yet produce);
• servicing external debt;
• currency interventions to maintain a managed “exchange ruble” rate;
• building international reserves.

Key innovation: export revenue is not automatically converted into “domestic” rubles at the market exchange rate. Instead, an administrative conversion mechanism works according to a fixed formula embedded in the tax system. The exporter pays taxes to the state in “exchange” currency, and the state then issues “domestic” rubles for payments to budgetfunded employees, pensioners, contractors. The ruble inside the country is not a derivative of the dollar, but an independent unit of account, sovereign by definition.

1.2. How to avoid a black market and dual pricing

The critical question always asked by sceptics: “Why wouldn’t people start exchanging cheap domestic rubles for expensive foreign currency on the black market?” The answer lies in the construction.

First, domestic rubles are not freely convertible into foreign currency. They can be exchanged only for targeted foreign economic operations (business trips, medical treatment abroad, tuition fees) under a special permission procedure. Attempts at mass conversion would be suppressed as currency crimes. The experience of the USSR in the 1960s1980s and of modern China shows that such a system can be maintained for decades if it is backed by real goods and services available for domestic rubles.

Second, capital flight loses its meaning. If a plant can buy a machine inside the country for 5 million rubles (which corresponds, say, to 5 thousand euros at the internal parity), while trying to buy the same machine abroad would cost it 5 million euros at the exchange rate (i.e., 1,000 times more) — the choice is obvious. A dual exchange rate stimulates import substitution and makes capital flight pointless.

Third, the domestic ruble receives powerful commodity backing. If the state creates conditions under which domestic rubles can buy everything necessary for life and business — from bread to an apartment to a machine — demand for foreign currency for domestic payments falls to zero. Imports become a luxury, not a necessity, and only those who really need it will pay for it.

1.3. Emission and inflation: the main fear

“That’s hyperinflation!” – the next cry of classical monetarists. Indeed, any emission without backing leads to devaluation of money. But the “Dual Ruble” model assumes emission not “out of thin air” but against real collateral.

How it works:

• The state receives taxes from exporters in hard currency (dollars, euros, yuan). This currency is a real asset that can be used for imports, investment or reserves.
• In parallel, the state issues “domestic” rubles to finance the budget, but strictly in an amount corresponding to tax revenues in foreign currency recalculated at the internal parity.
• Thus, emission does not create an excessive money supply, but merely transfers resources from the external circuit to the internal one. The total amount of “means of payment” in the economy does not grow uncontrollably.
• In addition, the state can use foreign exchange reserves to directly purchase goods on the world market and then sell them domestically for domestic rubles, withdrawing excess liquidity (sterilisation).

Thus, inflation remains under control — it will be determined by the balance of supply and demand in the domestic market, not by speculation on exchange rates.

Part 2. Benefits for all: examining each stakeholder

2.1. For producers (farmers, factories, processors)

Today any producer is a hostage of a double blow. He sells his product on the domestic market at ruble prices limited by the population’s purchasing power. But he buys raw materials, equipment, fuel at prices linked to world exchanges.

After the introduction of the “Golden Ruble”:

• Costs shrink by dozens of times. Diesel for a combine, fertilisers, packaging, equipment rental – everything produced domestically or imported through the “green corridor” of critical imports is paid for at the internal parity. Production costs fall, and with them the need to work at a loss or breakeven disappears.
• Competition with imports becomes fair. Noncritical imported goods will be sold at prices set by the exchange rate, i.e., 80–100 times more expensive than domestic analogues. This is not a ban on imports, but their natural marketdriven displacement. Russian producers gain a colossal competitive advantage without quotas or duties.
• Profitability returns. With costs tied to the domestic ruble and prices also shaped by domestic demand, a normal margin appears. Enterprises can invest in development rather than just survive.

2.2. For the state and the budget

Today the state spends trillions on dampers, subsidies, import substitution programmes that often fail because of fundamental distortions. A dual exchange rate solves the problem radically.

• The tax base remains high. Exporters pay taxes in hard currency at the exchange rate. For the budget, this means revenues comparable to today’s, and sometimes higher – due to the elimination of grey schemes and transfer pricing that currently erode the base.
• Costs for currency interventions disappear. The Central Bank no longer needs to spend reserves to smooth exchange rate swings. The “exchange ruble” can float freely, while the “domestic” one is fixed.
• Resources for development appear. Money freed from subsidising dampers and endless support for dying industries can be directed to infrastructure, education, science.

2.3. For the population (consumers)

The main beneficiary is the ordinary person. Not because someone will “give out money”, but because their real expenses will fall.

• Prices for socially significant goods (bread, milk, potatoes, meat, medicines, utilities) will stop rising with the exchange rate. They will be formed based on domestic production costs plus a reasonable markup.
• Food inflation, which today consumes up to 40% of the poorest people’s income, will slow sharply. The share of food expenditure will begin to decline from the current record 39.1%.
• Imported goods will become expensive – and that’s good. A latestmodel phone, a premium car or foreign cheese will become luxury items, not necessities. Meanwhile, domestic shoes, clothing, furniture, appliances will become more affordable.
• Savings in rubles will stop losing value due to exchange rate jumps. People will be able to save without fear of devaluation.

2.4. For exporters (oil, gas, metals, grain)

The exporter is the main “loser” in this model – but a loser fairly and manageably.

• Revenue in foreign currency remains. No one takes away the exporter’s dollars and euros. They still sell resources at world prices.
• Taxes are paid in foreign currency, eliminating disputes over transfer pricing.
• Conversion into rubles for domestic settlements follows a fixed formula embedded in the tax code. The exporter cannot choose a “favourable” exchange rate – they work under rules that are the same for everyone.
• Incentive for domestic investment. If an exporter wants to build a plant or buy equipment in Russia, they can do it much cheaper (in terms of domestic rubles) than importing. This brings capital back into the real sector.

2.5. For importers (critical and noncritical)

Importers fall into two categories: those who bring vital goods (medicines, machine tools, microelectronics, seeds) and those who bring consumer goods.

• Critical imports get a “green corridor”. The state defines a list of goods not yet produced in Russia, and for them a preferential foreign exchange conversion regime (at the exchange rate) with possible subsidies is maintained.
• Noncritical imports become economically unviable. Bringing in cheap Chinese toys or Turkish clothes when a domestic analogue is 50 times cheaper will simply not happen. Imports will shrink naturally.

2.6. For the banking system and financial market

Banks will stop earning from currency speculation and stop being “casinos”.

• The dollar and euro lose their status as “domestic means of payment”. They can be held in accounts, but cannot be used to buy flats, cars, products inside the country – only for foreign contracts.
• The focus of banks shifts to lending to the real sector, mortgages, consumer lending in rubles. That is what the economy needs.
• The need for “currency corridors”, “mandatory sale of proceeds” and other adhoc instruments that only multiply chaos disappears.

Part 3. What does this mean for the international economy?

The “Dual Ruble” model does not mean “closing off” Russia. On the contrary, it makes Russia a predictable and reliable partner.

• Export contracts will remain in foreign currency or in rubles at the exchange rate – as partners agree. China, India, Turkey, and BRICS countries are already used to settlements in national currencies.
• Critical technology imports will continue. We are not abandoning machine tools, medicines, microchips. We simply optimise their purchase by paying “expensive” foreign currency while simultaneously stimulating the creation of our own substitutes.
• The flow of investment will not disappear. A foreign investor who wants to build a plant in Russia will receive profit in rubles, but can then convert it into foreign currency to repatriate dividends. This creates demand for rubles on the external market and strengthens them.
• No one cancels international reserves. Gold, yuan, friendly currencies remain in the Central Bank’s arsenal for emergencies.

Key advantage: Russia stops being an exporter that finances other economies by buying their bonds and accumulating their currencies. Instead, it becomes a country that uses its resources for its own development.

Part 4. Objections and answers. A realistic view

4.1. “This is a return to the Soviet ruble!”

No. The Soviet ruble was nonconvertible by definition and was not backed by consumer goods, which created shortages and queues. In the “Dual Ruble” model, the domestic ruble is backed by everything that Russian factories, farms and power stations produce. There will be no shortages – there will be an abundance of domestic goods because producers will find it profitable to produce them.

4.2. “What about a black market for foreign currency?”

A black market is possible if there is a huge gap between demand and supply of foreign currency. In our model, domestic business does not need foreign currency for settlements – it needs rubles. Individuals can receive foreign currency only for foreign travel, medical treatment, studies under a permit system. Mass conversion would be a criminal offence. The experience of China and many other countries shows that such a system works when it is backed by economic incentives.

4.3. “This will kill export competitiveness”

No. Exporters still receive foreign currency at world prices. Their competitiveness depends on production efficiency, not on the ruble exchange rate. Moreover, cheap domestic resources (fuel, electricity, building materials) will make it cheaper for exporters to build infrastructure, logistics, and process goods.

4.4. “What about foreign investment?”

A foreign investor investing in a plant will receive profit in rubles. To repatriate dividends, they will have to convert rubles into foreign currency. Demand for rubles on the external market will grow, gradually making the ruble more convertible and in demand. No one prohibits foreigners from buying Russian goods for rubles.

Part 5. What the state should do: a roadmap

Transition to a twocircuit model is not an instant revolution but a carefully thoughtout reform.

Step 1. Legislative framework.
Amend the “Currency Regulation” law, enshrining the division into “domestic” and “exchange” rubles. Define the list of domestic settlements that are made at the fixed nominal rate and the list of external operations for which the exchange rate is maintained.

Step 2. Setting the internal parity.
Choose an anchor – for example, 1 euro = 1 ruble. This is a political decision, but it must be economically justified: the basket of goods consumed domestically in rubles should be comparable to the same basket in euros at current prices.

Step 3. Tax system revision.
Tax exporters in foreign currency, followed by issuing domestic rubles for the budget. Abolish or radically change the damper mechanism.

Step 4. Building infrastructure.
Introduce a system of targeted foreign currency accounts for individuals and legal entities. Launch a ruble commodity exchange with its own price indicators.

Step 5. Communication.
Explain to the population and businesses that this is not a default or hyperinflation, but a transition to a sovereign monetary system where the ruble is backed by real goods and will be stable.

Conclusion. Who benefits from a dualcircuit ruble?

Let’s return to the question we started with. Cui prodest – who benefits from a twocircuit ruble?

• Benefits producers, who stop working at a loss.
• Benefits consumers, who stop spending half their salary on food.
• Benefits the budget, which stops financing holes and starts investing in development.
• Benefits exporters, who receive clear rules of the game and incentives to reinvest.
• Benefits banks, which switch from currency speculation to lending.
• Benefits the state, which gains real, not declarative, sovereignty.

It benefits everyone except the parasitic layer of speculators, middlemen and those who profit from the weakness of the ruble and the gap between export prices and domestic poverty. The “Dual Ruble” model is a rejection of the role of a “gas station” and a transition to the status of a country that itself determines the value of its labour and resources. This is not a utopia. It is a pragmatic response to the challenges of an age when previous monetary theories have collapsed.

What to do right now?

Subscribe to “Kafedra” on Zen.
Read, reflect, discuss. Share with those who also want not to watch but to act.

Your next step:

• Open the “Savings” tab in your bank app.
• Ask yourself: what will happen to this money if the ruble is devalued tomorrow?
• Start diversifying: cash, gold, cryptocurrency (selfcustody only), commodity reserves.

We do not make empty promises. We provide working models.
Change your perspective. Act.

The article was prepared by the editorial board of the journal “Kafedra” for participants of the Economic Convergence. When quoting, a link to the original source is required.