US Loses Control Over Global Liquidity — Dollar, Treasuries, and Bitcoin | SforNews

THE UNITED STATES – LOSING CONTROL OVER GLOBAL LIQUIDITY: THE DOLLAR, TREASURIES, AND BITCOIN AS A CHALLENGE

A Diagnosis of the Old Model and Its Place in the New Energy-Digital System

INTRODUCTION: A BRIEF DIAGNOSIS

The United States remains the world’s largest economy, but its financial model is cracking at the seams. The national debt has reached $39.38 trillion [1][2]. The Federal Reserve has held the rate at 3.5–3.75% for more than half a year [3], yet inflation has exceeded the 2% target for more than five years and accelerated again in the first half of 2026 [4]. Confidence in the dollar as a reserve asset is weakening – although its share in global reserves formally rose to 57.13% in the first quarter of 2026 [5], reserve managers increasingly view it as a risky asset [6].

The US paradox: it leads in Bitcoin mining – 37.5–42.5% of global hashrate [7][8] – but at the same time it is losing control over global liquidity. It formally banned the CBDC until 2030 [9], but private stablecoins (USDC, USDT) effectively function as a “digital dollar”. It proclaims “energy dominance” [10], yet simultaneously spends billions on coal subsidies and rolls back renewable energy [11]. It promotes ESG as an instrument of external pressure [18], but domestically faces growing resistance to that agenda [19].

The US is not building a new system – it is trying to hold on to the old one. And that makes it the most vulnerable link in the global transition.

SECTION 1. THE OLD MODEL: WHAT EXISTED, WHAT BROKE

The American model of global hegemony over the past 50 years rested on three pillars:

This model no longer works. The table below shows the dynamics of key indicators, clearly illustrating how the “map” (promises of stability) has diverged from the “territory” (real debt and inflation).

Year	US National Debt ($ trillion)	Average Inflation (%)	Oil Price ($/bbl)
1980	0.9	13.5	30
1990	3.2	5.4	20
2000	5.6	3.4	28
2010	13.5	1.6	80
2020	27.7	1.2	40
2026 (July)	39.38 [1]	~4.0 (actual, above target) [4]	~82 (Brent) [20]

Debt is growing at an unprecedented rate. In 2026, the national debt increases by an average of $100,207 per second** [1]. Over the year it grew by **$3.16 trillion. The U.S. GAO estimates that $40 trillion will be reached as early as October 2026 [2].

Interest payments are devouring the budget. Net interest expenses will reach 13.95% of all federal outlays in fiscal year 2026 [1]. The average interest rate on debt servicing is 3.411%, versus 1.472% five years ago [2]. This means that an increasing share of tax revenue goes not to infrastructure or social programs, but to servicing debt obligations to creditors – primarily the Fed and foreign holders of Treasuries.

Confidence in the dollar is declining. According to a UBS survey of reserve managers, convictions are changing faster than portfolios [6]. Respondents note that while the dollar remains dominant, its status as a “riskfree asset” is being questioned. China and BRICS continue to diversify: China has been buying gold for 20 consecutive months, and the yuan’s share in global reserves is rising [5].

Inflation remains out of control. The Fed’s 2% target has not been reached for more than five years. JPMorgan forecasts that the Fed will keep the rate unchanged through the end of 2026 and then raise it by 25 bps in September 2027 [4]. Markets have shifted from expecting easing to discussing tightening – a mirror image of Europe and China, where rates are either frozen or being cut.

Demographic backdrop. Although the US is in a better position than China or Europe (population grows thanks to migration), domestic social tensions and rising healthcare costs (Medicare, Medicaid) create additional fiscal risks [21]. The ageing of the babyboomer generation increases the burden on the budget, reducing room for manoeuvre.

The map (dollar as global currency, riskfree Treasuries, financial dominance) no longer reflects the territory ($40 trillion debt, falling confidence, inflation, fragmentation of the world into currency blocs).

SECTION 2. ENERGY PROFILE: WHAT EXISTS, WHAT IS MISSING

The United States is the world’s largest energy producer. Yet its energy policy is deeply contradictory, exacerbated by changing administrations.

What exists	What is missing
Vast natural gas reserves (40% of generation) [10]	A unified energy strategy (policy changes every four years) [11]
Developed nuclear power (18% of generation) [10]	Investment certainty (green projects are cancelled, new subsidies go to coal) [11]
Growing renewables (25% of generation in 2026, 27% in 2027) [10]	Sufficient capacity to cover surging demand (AI data centres are consuming everything) [12]
World leader in oil and gas production [10]	Energy sovereignty (97% dependence on imported mining equipment) [13]
Texas and Pennsylvania – cheap energy hubs for mining [7]	Flexible grid infrastructure (overload during peak hours in Texas) [15]

Key fact: The US consumes more energy than it produces, and demand is growing at record rates. In 2026, the commercial sector for the first time in history will surpass residential in electricity consumption – due to the AI data centre boom. Total electricity consumption will reach 4,271 billion kWh in 2026 [12]. This creates competition for resources: miners, AI data centres, and industry are fighting for every megawatt.

At the same time, the Trump administration pursues a policy that, as The Guardian analysts put it, “spends billions to block wind and solar projects, funding new fossilfuel generation that cannot yet compensate for the loss of clean energy” [11]. In 2026, renewable projects totalling 7 GW were cancelled, while coal plants received new subsidies despite promises of a “clean future”. This is the direct opposite of European (closing nuclear) and Chinese (building everything at once) strategies.

Conclusion: The US has enormous energy potential, but political instability and the absence of a longterm strategy make that potential inefficiently utilised. At the same time, American miners actively use cheap natural gas in Texas and Pennsylvania to mine Bitcoin [7][8], creating local oases of efficiency amidst general chaos.

SECTION 3. POSITION ON MINING AND CRYPTOCURRENCIES

Here lies the central paradox – and the main ace – of the United States.

The actual situation: The US is the world leader in Bitcoin hashrate. According to Hashrate Index, as of January 2026, the US controlled 37.5% of global hashrate (~400 EH/s) [7]. According to KuCoin estimates, the US share reaches 42.5% [8]. Public mining companies listed on US exchanges control 42.6% of the network’s hashrate – a record, up from 14.8% in January 2022 [8]. This means the US has transformed from an observer into a monopolist of Western mining.

Regulatory environment: Mining is legal at the federal level and in all 50 states. The federal government takes an openly supportive stance. The White House declares its intention to make America the “crypto capital of the world” [7]. This is a fundamental difference from China (where mining is sometimes banned, sometimes allowed) and Europe (where mining is economically unviable).

Key event of 2026: The “Mined in America Act” (S. 4251). The bill, introduced by Senators Cassidy and Lummis on March 30, 2026 [14], provides for:

However, here lies the Achilles’ heel: 97% of mining equipment in the US is produced in China [13]. The bill creates incentives for developing domestic ASIC production – but that will take years, and until then the US remains hostage to Chinese supplies. In the event of geopolitical escalation, China could cut off that channel, collapsing US hashrate.

The US paradox: it leads in mining but is completely dependent on Chinese equipment. It creates a strategic Bitcoin reserve but simultaneously bans CBDCs until 2030. It wants to be the “crypto capital”, but its regulatory environment remains fragmented: New York imposes a moratorium on data centres above 50 MW [15], while Texas, on the contrary, attracts miners with tax breaks.

SECTION 4. THE POSITION OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM (FED)

The Fed is the world’s most influential central bank. But its tools are ceasing to work in the new reality.

Tools:

Why isn’t the rate cut? Inflation has remained above 2% for more than five years [4]. Markets expected a cut in early 2026, but now a hike is being discussed. JPMorgan forecasts that the Fed will keep the rate unchanged through the end of 2026 and then raise it by 25 bps in September 2027 [4]. The economy, according to official data, is growing at a “solid pace” [3], giving the Fed formal grounds not to ease policy.

New element: The Fed is losing the battle for the digital dollar.

In 2026, three key events took place:

What does this mean in practice?

The Fed paradox: it cannot control inflation, cannot stop the decline in dollar confidence, and cannot offer a digital alternative. The private market (stablecoins, Bitcoin) fills the vacuum that the Fed cannot close. Moreover, administration policy actively pushes the market toward Bitcoin (via the strategic reserve) and stablecoins (via the absence of a CBDC), completely reshaping the central bank’s role.

SECTION 5. ESG AND THE “GREEN AGENDA”: WASHINGTON’S DOUBLE STANDARDS

The US approach to ESG deserves separate attention – a tool it promoted for export but increasingly ignores at home.

Export: For decades, the US and Europe promoted ESG (Environmental, Social, Governance) as a mandatory standard for access to capital, using three major players – BlackRock (~$10 trillion), Vanguard (~$7 trillion), and State Street (~$4 trillion) [18]. These funds effectively dictated terms to sovereign states and corporations.

Domestic: However, in 2025–2026, a reversal occurred. The Trump administration and several Republicanled states declared ESG an “antiAmerican” tool that harms energy sovereignty and jobs in the coal and oilandgas sectors [19]. Major pension funds in Texas and Florida withdrew billions from “green” funds.

Result: The US demands decarbonisation and ESG compliance from other countries, but itself subsidises coal [11] and blocks wind projects [11]. This is a classic double standard that undermines trust in American institutions and shows that the “green agenda” was a tool to contain competitors, not a genuine environmental policy.

SECTION 6. ARCHITECTURAL CONCLUSION: WHICH PATH IS OPEN TO THE US

The United States is the only country that simultaneously:

Unlike Europe, the US has energy and mining infrastructure. It will not “import” Bitcoin – it will mine and accumulate it. However, its domestic energy policy is chaotic: coal subsidies coexist with an AI data centre boom, creating capacity shortages.

Unlike China, the US is not building a state digital currency or a parallel payment infrastructure (like mBridge). It relies on the private market – stablecoins and Bitcoin. This makes its system more flexible, but also more vulnerable: private issuers are not instruments of state policy to the same degree that eCNY is for the PBOC.

Unlike Russia, the US has a strategy, but it is fragmented and depends on the political cycle. The Trump administration promotes a Bitcoin reserve but bans CBDCs. Congress supports mining, but 97% of equipment is Chinese [13]. This is a “bitofeverything” strategy without a systemic connection.

US weaknesses:

Main conclusion:

The US will not “import” Bitcoin like Europe. It has its own energy, its own miners, and its own (informal for now) accumulation strategy. But it is losing control over global liquidity because the old model (dollar + Treasuries) no longer works, and the new one (Bitcoin reserve + stablecoins) is not yet built as a system.

For the US, Bitcoin is not an “energy coupon” (as for Russia) nor a “tactical tool” (as for China). It is a political project – an attempt to maintain dominance in the new system by accumulating an asset that it cannot control by issuance, but can control through regulatory levers and reserves.

The question is not whether the US will use Bitcoin. The question is whether it can integrate it into its architecture faster than debt and inflation destroy the old system.

CONCLUSION: HOW THE US FITS INTO THE GLOBAL TRANSITION

The US is neither an architect nor a victim of the new system. The US is a defender of the old system, trying to use new tools to preserve it.

China is building parallel infrastructure (eCNY + mBridge + gold). Europe is becoming a permanent importer of Bitcoin. Russia is trying to monetise energy through mining, but without a strategy.

The US bans CBDCs but accumulates Bitcoin. It leads in mining but depends on Chinese equipment. It prints dollars but loses confidence. It promotes ESG but ignores it at home.

Global meaning: The US shows that even the world’s most powerful economy cannot ignore fundamental changes. The dollar is no longer a “riskfree” asset. Treasuries are no longer a “safe haven”. Bitcoin becomes an alternative not because someone wants it, but because the old system no longer works.

The question is not whether the dollar will collapse. The question is whether the US can build a new system faster than the old one collapses. So far, the answer is “no”, because it lacks a unified architectural plan. It has a set of tactical decisions that contradict each other. And that is the main difference from China, which does have such a plan.

COMPLETE LIST OF SOURCES

NEXT ARTICLE IN THE SERIES: “Japan – the Yen, 250% GDP Debt, and the ZeroRate Trap”.

© 2026, Editorial Board of “Kafedra” and SforNews magazines.
When citing, reference to the original source is mandatory.