Hashrate as the New Oil — The Energy Logic of Bitcoin Mining | SforNews

  • 2 Aug, 2026
    | Salome K

HASHRATE AS THE NEW OIL: THE ENERGY LOGIC OF BITCOIN MINING

INTRODUCTION: THE OLD GAME ON A NEW FIELD

Bitcoin mining reproduces the same logic as the global oil market — but with new players and new rules. Instead of wells — data centers. Instead of tankers — hashrate. Instead of OPEC+ — a duopoly of the U.S. and Russia, with China’s technological dominance.

Key observation: countries that dominated the old energy system have every chance to maintain influence in the new one. But only if they recognize the new rules of the game.

PART 1. OIL LOGIC VS BITCOIN MINING

Parameter

Oil Industry

Bitcoin Mining

Resource

Oil

Electricity

Export

Tankers, pipelines

Hashrate in the global network

Production cost

Russia — low, U.S. (shale) — high

Russia — low ($/kWh), U.S. — high

Profitability at lowprices

Russian oil — profitable, shale — unprofitable (wells close)

Russian mining — profitable, American — on the edge

Leverage

OPEC+ (Saudi Arabia + Russia)

No coordination among producers

Chain control

U.S. — dollar, Russia — physical oil, China — refining

U.S. — regulation and capital, Russia — energy, China — equipment

Conclusion: the oil logic fully transfers to mining — but without a cartel agreement. Russia has the same advantage — low production costs — but does not use it systematically.

PART 2. WHO CONTROLS WHAT IN THE NEW SYSTEM

Dimension

U.S.

Russia

China

Energy

Expensive (shale, gas)

Cheap (hydro, gas, nuclear)

Medium (coal, hydro)

Equipment

97% imported from China

99% imported fromChina

Produces 90% of globalASICs

Regulation

Active (strategic reserve, laws)

Passive (regionalbans)

Strict (official ban, but unofficial mining)

Capital

Huge (ETF, institutionalinvestors)

Limited (sanctions)

Limited (capital controls)

Strategy

Exists (maintaindominance)

None (tacticaldecisions)

Exists (parallelinfrastructure)

Conclusion: no country controls the entire chain. This is a battlefield of architectures. Russia has an energy advantage but loses on strategy and equipment control.

PART 3. WHY RUSSIA CAN INCREASE ITS HASHRATE SHARE

3.1. Economic advantage: the cheapest energy

Country

Electricity cost, $/kWh

Cost to mine 1 BTC, $

U.S.

0.05–0.08

55,000–75,000

Russia

0.02–0.04

35,000–45,000

China

0.03–0.05

40,000–55,000

At a BTC price of $60,000–65,000:

Russian miners are in profit (margin $15,000–30,000).
American miners are on the edge of profitability or in the red.

Economics favor Russia. If current BTC and energy prices hold, mining in Russia will be more attractive than in the U.S.

3.2. Physical relocation of capacity: possible, but expensive

Relocating 100 EH/s (roughly 2–3 million ASIC miners) requires:

Logistics: containers, transport, customs (especially given sanctions). Equipment is mostly Chinese — and China can either facilitate or block supplies.
Infrastructure: sites with available capacity. Russia has available capacity in Siberia, Irkutsk region, Krasnoyarsk region, but not everywhere has the necessary grid connections.
Time: 6–12 months for deployment.

Relocation is possible. But it requires time, money and political will.

PART 4. WHY RUSSIA WILL NOT BECOME A MONOPOLIST

4.1. Lack of strategy

Unlike the U.S. (strategic reserve, tax incentives, “Mined in America Act”) and China (control over ASIC production), Russia does not have a unified state program for mining development.

Mining is legalized, but seasonal restrictions are imposed in Irkutsk and other regions in winter (to avoid overloading grids).
State corporations (Rosseti, Rosatom) are not interested in attracting miners on a large scale — they sell electricity at fixed tariffs, and mining reduces power reserves.
There is no coordination between the federal center and the regions.

Paradox: Russia has the cheapest energy, but the state does not create conditions for systemic mining growth.

4.2. Dependence on Chinese equipment

97–99% of ASIC miners in the U.S. and Russia are Chinese-made.

Manufacturer

Country

Market Share

Bitmain

China

~70%

MicroBT

China

~15%

Canaan

China

~8%

Others

U.S., Europe

~7%

If China decides to restrict supplies to Russia (under U.S. pressure or for its own geopolitical reasons), Russian miners will be left without new equipment.

4.3. No cartel agreement

In oil, Russia coordinates with OPEC+, allowing it to support prices. In mining, no such mechanism exists. Each country acts alone, reducing efficiency and creating chaos.

PART 5. SCENARIOS FOR CHANGING RUSSIA’S HASHRATE SHARE

Scenario

Probability

Russia’sfinal share

Key factor

Spontaneous relocation (miners move to Russia on their own due to low energy prices)

50–60%

22–25%

Economic attractiveness

State strategy (Kremlin adopts a mining development program with incentives and infrastructure)

20–30%

25–30%

Political will

Sanctions pressure (U.S. blocks equipment supplies and access to capital)

40–50%

16–18%

Geopoliticalconstraints

Most likely scenario: partial relocation of capacity (+5–8% to current share) over 12–24 months, but without a systemic breakthrough. Russia could reach 22–24% of hashrate, but this requires a strategy that does not yet exist.

GLOBAL CONCLUSION

Oil logic fully transfers to mining:

Russia — a “cheap producer” that can operate at low prices. This is its advantage, but it does not use it systematically.
U.S. — an “expensive producer” that uses regulation and capital to stay in the game.
China — “owner of the tools” (ASIC miners). It profits from everyone.

In Bitcoin, the chain looks like this:

Energy (Russia) → Equipment (China) → Capital and regulation (U.S.)

No one controls the entire chain. This is a battlefield of architectures.

Russia can increase its hashrate share, but without a strategy and without control over equipment, it will remain a “raw material appendage” of the new system — just as in oil it remains a supplier of raw materials, not an architect of prices.

PRACTICAL CONCLUSIONS FOR INVESTORS AND ANALYSTS

1. Monitor China’s policy on ASIC exports. If Beijing restricts supplies to Russia, hashrate growth will stall.
2. Track regional bans in Russia. If restrictions in Irkutsk and Krasnoyarsk are tightened, some capacity will move to Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan.
3. Watch U.S. initiatives on the strategic reserve. This could change the supply-demand balance for BTC and affect mining profitability across different jurisdictions.

This analysis is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice. The material is based on data from Hashrate Index, CoinMarketCap, EIA and open sources.

Next material: Regional map of Russia’s available energy capacity, analysis of the “Mined in America Act,” and the impact of these factors on Bitcoin price and global hashrate balance.