Russia in trouble: from fuel crisis to pressure on the ruble, banks, and savings

13 Aug, 2026
| Salome K

By Antonio GEORGOPALIS

Expert Financial European Affairs

August 12th, 2026

The war in Ukraine is increasingly less fought on the front lines. A second battlefield is located deep within Russia itself: the economy. In recent months, Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian refineries have placed increasing pressure on fuel supplies. At the same time, Russia is grappling with persistent inflation, high interest rates, a fragile budget, and rising risks within the banking sector. For the Russian state, these problems individually may not yet pose an existential threat, but together they create economic pressure that is becoming increasingly difficult to conceal.

What for many Russians was until recently primarily a war taking place elsewhere is consequently beginning to be felt increasingly directly in daily life. Fuel is becoming harder to come by, certain goods are becoming more expensive, loans remain costly, and savers are once again beginning to wonder how much their money will actually be worth.

The fuel crisis is becoming increasingly visible.

The consequences of the attacks on Russian energy infrastructure are by now difficult to deny. Russian refineries have been repeatedly hit, causing parts of production to be temporarily shut down or reduced. The problems have spread to an increasing number of regions over the course of 2026.

The most recent and striking sign of the severity of the situation came this week. Russia has begun importing gasoline from India to cover domestic shortages. The first shipment arrived on August 5. That one of the world’s largest oil producers has to turn to imports for its domestic fuel supply is not in itself proof of an economic collapse, but it is a remarkable signal of the pressure currently facing the Russian refining industry.

Moreover, the situation is not the same everywhere. In large cities, supplies can be restored relatively quickly, whereas smaller regions and more remote areas are much more vulnerable. Temporary shortages, rationing, and long queues may occur there. The Russian government is attempting to manage the problems with emergency measures, but as long as refineries are regularly affected, the underlying vulnerability remains.

Why a gasoline shortage is much bigger than a problem at the pump

A fuel shortage affects much more than just motorists. Gasoline and diesel are indispensable components of virtually every economic activity. Trucks need fuel to transport food and other goods. Farmers need diesel for their machinery. Factories depend on transport to bring in raw materials and deliver products.

When fuel becomes more expensive or harder to obtain, the costs of the entire economic chain rise as a result. A transport company pays more, the producer pays more, and ultimately the consumer pays more as well.

The Russian central bank has now itself determined that the rise in fuel prices has accelerated the increase in consumer prices. According to the central bank, higher fuel prices in June contributed approximately 0.3 percentage points to the monthly price trend and approximately 0.2 percentage points to the price increase in the first half of the year.

This makes it clear why an attack on a refinery can ultimately have consequences for a Russian family that has absolutely nothing to do with the war.

The economic chain runs from a damaged refinery, via a truck and a distribution center, ultimately to the price someone pays in the supermarket.

Inflation: not hyperinflation, but a persistent problem

It is important not to exaggerate the situation. Russia is currently not in a situation of hyperinflation, and official inflation does not exceed ten percent. The most recent available figures indicate an annual inflation of approximately six percent. That is significantly higher than the Russian central bank’s target.

That is precisely why the situation is so complicated for the central bank. It is trying to slow down the economy to bring price increases under control, but at the same time, growth is weakening. The central bank has now lowered its forecast for economic growth in 2026 to approximately zero to one percent and expects inflation of six to seven percent for this year. Rising fuel prices are a major source of additional pressure in this regard.

The problem for Russia, therefore, is not that prices explode overnight. The problem is that purchasing power is slowly being eroded while economic growth virtually grinds to a halt.

That is perhaps even more important to an employee than a spectacular inflation figure. When wages rise by a few percent but food, transport, energy, and other necessary expenses become more expensive faster, someone might not become poorer on paper, but in practice they do.

The ruble as a thermometer of the economy

Added to this is the development of the ruble. The Russian currency experienced periods of significant fluctuations in 2026. The exchange rate is not solely a consequence of the attacks on refineries. Oil prices, export revenues, sanctions, capital flows, Russian fiscal policy, and the central bank’s interest rate policy also play a role.

Nevertheless, a weak ruble is important for the average Russian. When the currency depreciates against the dollar and the euro, many imported goods become more expensive. This can lead directly to higher prices for foreign products, but also indirectly for goods for which Russia requires foreign components, technology, or raw materials.

The exchange rate is therefore more than a financial figure on a screen. For families who hold their savings exclusively in rubles, a prolonged decline in value can mean that they will be able to buy fewer goods and services with the same amount in the future.

Do Russians then have to convert their savings into dollars or euros?

This creates a dilemma that could become increasingly relevant for many Russian savers. When someone fears that the ruble will weaken further, it stands to reason to consider holding a portion of their assets in a stronger foreign currency.

That can offer protection against a further decline in the ruble. For example, someone who converts rubles into dollars and the ruble subsequently falls sharply in value retains greater wealth when expressed in rubles. However, that does not mean that it is wise for every Russian employee to convert their savings entirely into dollars or euros.

After all, exchange rates can change again. Moreover, foreign currency in Russia is not always easily available, withdrawable, or freely usable. There may be restrictions, costs, and discrepancies between official and actual exchange rates. Furthermore, for someone who receives their income in rubles and makes virtually all their expenses in rubles, a large part of their financial life remains tied to the Russian currency.

The development is therefore particularly interesting as a sign of changing trust. When citizens feel that their national currency is becoming less reliable as a store of value, there is a tendency to keep a portion of their wealth outside the national currency. This does not necessarily mean a massive capital flight immediately. However, on a large scale, it can further increase pressure on the currency.

For the average Russian, it ultimately comes down to a simple question: how much of his hard-earned savings will still have the same purchasing power in a few years?

A second problem arises at the banks.

In addition to the currency and inflation, another development deserves close attention: the increasing pressure on the Russian banking sector.

Caution is necessary in this regard. It is currently incorrect to state that Russian banks are on the verge of bankruptcy en masse. The Russian central bank declared on August 11 that it does not see general liquidity problems in the banking sector. According to the regulator, there are tensions at individual large banks, but there is no general liquidity crisis.

However, that does not mean that nothing is wrong.

The largest Russian bank, Sberbank , warned in late July of a deterioration in the quality of its credit portfolio. Companies are increasingly facing a combination of high interest rates, weaker economic growth, and increasing financial pressure. As a result, the risk is rising that loans will not be repaid, or will be repaid only partially.

This is important because banks ultimately depend on the repayment of loans. When companies and families find it increasingly difficult to repay their debts, banks must make more provisions for potential losses. This reduces their financial headroom and may make them more cautious about granting new credit.

This creates a vicious circle once again. A weak economy makes it more difficult for companies to repay loans. Banks become more cautious. Credit becomes more expensive or harder to obtain. As a result, investing becomes more difficult, and economic growth can slow down further.

The liquidity of Russian banks is becoming a sensitive issue.

Even more striking is the discussion regarding the amount of available rubles at Russian banks.

Sberbank stated in late July that Russian banks lacked sufficient free ruble liquidity to purchase new Russian government bonds on a large scale. This is remarkable because the Russian government is increasingly dependent on domestic financing to cover its budget deficit. The war has caused government spending to rise sharply, while revenues are under pressure.

Here, too, the picture needs to be nuanced. A shortage of free liquidity at banks does not mean that the banks can no longer return their customers’ money. The central bank has instruments to provide liquidity to the banking system and has indicated that it will do so when necessary.

However, the development does demonstrate that the Russian financial sector is increasingly having to function within an economy heavily burdened by the war.

What does this mean for the savings of ordinary Russians?

For an employee who has saved his entire life, the greatest risk is not necessarily that his bank goes bankrupt tomorrow. The much more likely problem is that his savings are slowly losing purchasing power.

Suppose someone has accumulated a substantial amount of rubles over the years. If inflation remains higher than the interest he effectively receives on his savings for several years, the real value of that wealth may decline. He might then still have exactly the same number of rubles in his account, but he can buy less with that money.

Added to this is the risk posed by the bank itself. Russia has a deposit guarantee scheme, but the protection has limits. For savers with large amounts, it is therefore important at which bank the money is held and what portion actually falls under the guarantee scheme.

The combination of inflation, exchange rate risk, and banking risk makes the financial landscape for Russian households more complicated than a few years ago.

A Russian economy that has not yet collapsed, but is costing more and more

It would be wrong to conclude from these developments that the Russian economy is on the verge of an immediate collapse. Russia still possesses too many financial and economic resources for that. The country has large energy reserves, an extensive industrial base, and a government willing to direct a very large portion of available resources to the war economy.

However, an economy can simultaneously continue to function and yet become increasingly unhealthy.

That is perhaps the best way to describe the current Russian situation. The economy is barely growing, while the state requires enormous sums for defense. Fuel supplies are becoming more vulnerable. Inflation remains above the target. Companies are facing high financing costs and increasing credit risks. Banks have to deal with a more difficult economic climate, and the government requires increasingly more domestic financing.

According to recent calculations, the cost of servicing Russian government debt already amounted to approximately 3.9 trillion rubles in 2026. That illustrates how expensive borrowing becomes when interest rates remain high.

The real vulnerability lies in the accumulation

None of these problems is necessarily fatal for Russia in itself. A refinery can be repaired. A bank can receive liquidity from the central bank. The government can introduce new taxes or borrow more money. A weak ruble can strengthen again. Inflation can eventually fall.

The danger lies precisely in the accumulation.

If attacks on refineries continue, increasing resources must be deployed to stabilize the fuel supply. If war costs remain high, the budget remains under pressure. If inflation persists, interest rates cannot be lowered as quickly. If companies subsequently struggle to repay their loans, banks come under pressure.

And when ordinary Russians simultaneously notice that their groceries are becoming more expensive, their savings are losing purchasing power, and their currency is fluctuating, an abstract economic problem turns into a personal problem.

The war is coming ever closer to the Russian living room.

That is ultimately perhaps the most important development.

The economic consequences of the war are no longer visible only in budget figures or central bank statistics. They become visible at the gas station, in the supermarket, at the bank, and in the account where an employee keeps their savings.

The recent necessity to import gasoline from India is a particularly clear example of this. Russia possesses enormous oil reserves, yet still faces difficulties in making sufficient refined fuel available to its own population.

This creates a paradox that is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. Russia possesses enormous natural resources, but the war makes it increasingly expensive to keep that economic power fully available for its own population.

The Russian economy is therefore not necessarily on the brink of immediate collapse. However, it is being increasingly heavily burdened. Ultimately, the question is not only how many economic problems Russia can absorb today, but how many years the system can continue to bear this pressure without the costs for the ordinary population becoming ever greater.

For the Russian worker, that is perhaps the most concrete question of all. Not whether Russia will go bankrupt tomorrow, but whether his wages and savings will still have the same purchasing power in a year, two years, or five years.

And it is precisely there that the economic war is felt most acutely.