Capital Flight from Russia: Anatomy of Illusions & Shadow Schemes

14 Jul, 2026
| Salome K

CAPITAL FLIGHT FROM RUSSIA: A LONG HISTORY, A COMPLEX DIAGNOSIS

In the debate on capital flight, at least two main realities collide, each describing its part of a complex picture: mainstream economists (Tabakh, Kopeikin, Abramov) and academic critics (TsMAKP, Glazyev). Neither of these realities is the “absolute truth” — they all capture different aspects of the same process.

PART 1. MAINSTREAM ANALYSIS: DECLINE, CONTROL, REORIENTATION

Anton Tabakh (Expert RA):

Tabakh notes a structural decline in outflow: external debt more than halved (from $700B in 2014 to $299B), and net private sector capital outflow, according to Central Bank estimates, fell to $20–25B in 2023 versus $50–70B in the 2010s and the panic-driven $243B in 2014. He believes that today’s outflow is moderate, well-controlled, and fundamentally different in nature: servicing external debt and repatriating foreign investor income have practically ceased.

Olga Belenkaya (Finam):

Belenkaya explains the mechanisms behind the statistical outflow: reduction of external debt, acquisition of foreign assets by Russian companies (including trading intermediaries) to operate under sanctions, and transfers by individuals to foreign banks for using international payment cards.

Alexander Abramov (RANEPA):

Abramov warns: a strict ban on capital outflow will most likely cause significant inconvenience for businesses and citizens and will not be an effective solution, because alternative ways to circumvent restrictions will always emerge. He considers a more balanced strategy to be creating domestic conditions where investors find it more profitable to keep capital inside the country.

Boris Kopeikin (Stolypin Institute for Economic Growth):

Kopeikin acknowledges that capital flight has not stopped — only the “receiving points” have changed, now Dubai, Hong Kong, or Tel Aviv instead of Europe. However, he concedes that in some cases, investments abroad may be beneficial for individual companies and for Russia as a whole (logistics, raw material supplies, sales support).

PART 2. ACADEMIC CRITIQUE: THE CHRONIC 3–5% OF GDP GAP

TsMAKP (Oleg Solntsev, Vera Pankova):

“Russia has a chronic gap between gross national savings and domestic investment — 3–5% of GDP on average per year.” The real sector of the economy transfers 3 to 5% of GDP abroad annually — tens of billions of dollars. This very gap, leaking from the Russian economy, is that special source of money that could be redirected back into Russia. Hypothetically, this could be mutual investment in projects of non-financial companies belonging to the same group.

Sergei Glazyev (Academician, MEF):

Glazyev draws attention to the fact that massive capital flight continues “despite the war.” “Even in this situation, capital flight continues at around 50, 80, sometimes over $100 billion each year.” Over 15 years (2010–2024), the total “transfer from Russia to the global financial system” amounted to nearly $1 trillion.

Assessment of the situation:

Mainstream experts record a decline in outflow and explain it by structural reasons. TsMAKP and Glazyev record a chronic gap and insist that the problem has not been solved, only changed its form. Elvira Nabiullina urged not to confuse capital flight in the narrow sense with the financial account balance, which in 2022 reached a record $227 billion.

PART 3. THE PROBLEM OF DOUBLE BOOKKEEPING AND “OFF-BALANCE SHEET” ASSETS

Beyond official statistics and academic critique, there is another factor rarely considered in public analysis but significant for understanding the scale of the problem.

It concerns the existence of assets and rights of claim that are not reflected on the balance sheets of the Russian Federation but continue to be recorded in international registries and depositories. This applies, in particular, to funds in accounts with international settlement systems, as well as rights to income and annuities arising from international trusts and funds established in the mid-20th century under global agreements in which the USSR was a party.

According to public documents dated 1950–1970, part of such income and annuities was to be delivered to the USSR as reparations, capital investments, or payment for the use of assets. However, after 1991, their accounting and movement became opaque, and current Russian legislation does not provide a clear answer as to who owns these rights of claim and how they relate to the obligations of the Russian Federation.

Experts familiar with this issue note that:

• The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel holds accounts that were registered under the USSR in the 1990s and have still not been re-registered to the Russian Federation.

• International registries (including the UCC in the US) record rights of claim on debts and obligations formally belonging to the USSR, but for which the Russian side has not made active claims, creating legal uncertainty.

• A number of international organizations, including the IMF and the World Bank, continue to record on their balance sheets operations that began during the Soviet period but have not been completed.

Unlike shadow schemes (Mettmann), this parallel territory is not the result of malicious intent. Rather, it is the institutional legacy of the USSR’s collapse: no one completed the inventory and re-registration of all assets, liabilities, and rights of claim that existed as of 1991. As a result, these assets remain in a “suspended” state — formally they exist, but they are not accounted for in Russian statistics and do not participate in economic circulation.

When billions of dollars remain “suspended” in international depositories, and hundreds of billions annually flow into offshore accounts through well-designed schemes, talking about “stabilization” of outflow means ignoring a significant part of reality. The map of official statistics does not reflect this territory.

PART 4. INVESTIGATIONS: THE SHADOW SIDE

The Mettmann Public Company Limited Scheme:

The Cypriot company Mettmann Public Company Limited, registered in 2019, became public in 2022 and issued 500,000 corporate bonds worth €50 million on the Cyprus Stock Exchange. However, the placement was conducted via a private placement model — almost the entire volume was concentrated among several affiliated structures, turning a formally legal exchange operation into a controlled capital redistribution scheme.

Key figures:

• Zvonko Mičković — owns 82.5% of Mettmann.

• Oksana Hadjipavlou — a Cypriot citizen (born in the USSR), nominal director.

• Boris Usherovich — linked to the withdrawal of money from Russian Railways through the company “1520” (linked to the Rotenbergs), wanted internationally on corruption charges.

• Ilya Plotitsa — Usherovich’s trusted person, manages Cypriot offshore structures, appears in the Panama Papers.

• Alexander Vainshtein — Plotitsa’s relative, holds a significant package of shares and bonds.

Mechanism:

Money passes through a chain of affiliated structures: part goes as loans to related companies, part into EU real estate deals, and part into subsequent financial operations. At the “input” — money from Russian resources and government contracts. At the “output” — “clean” European capital, assets in a “clean” jurisdiction where the connection to the original capital is severed. When attention increases, the structure is wound down and assets are transferred to another company — legally new, but in practice a continuation of the old scheme.

PART 5. ARCHITECTURAL CONCLUSION

Mainstream analytics describe the map — official numbers, terminological disputes, recommendations for improving the investment climate. Investigations describe the territory — real capital withdrawal schemes where money loses its origin faster than regulators can track it.

Tabakh speaks of outflow stabilization. Kopeikin — of changing receiving points. Abramov — of structural factors. TsMAKP — of a chronic 3–5% GDP gap. Glazyev — of $1 trillion over 15 years. Investigations call it a financial construction set, where each stage is legally isolated, and it is precisely this modularity that makes such structures almost impossible to “shut down” with a single regulatory measure.

The question is not “is there outflow?” The question is “which outflow channels are the norm, and which are a systemic problem — and how do we distinguish between them?”

PART 6. WHAT CHRONIC CAPITAL FLIGHT MEANS FOR THE COUNTRY

Chronic capital flight is not just “numbers in reports.” It is a systemic problem with long-term consequences:

1. Lost investments in infrastructure, industry, and social services. Every dollar withdrawn is an unbuilt factory, an unrepaired road, an underfunded school.

2. Erosion of the tax base — capital escapes taxation, shifting the burden onto those who cannot leave: small businesses, employees, pensioners.

3. Entrenchment of inequality — some gain access to the “financial construction set” and offshore schemes, others face another tax hike and cuts to social programs.

4. Erosion of trust in institutions — when the system works for the privileged, all that remains for others is cynicism. This undermines the social contract and creates fertile ground for political instability.

5. Formation of a “dual economy” — the official one for reporting, the shadow one for the privileged. This perpetuates inefficiency and creates risks for future crises.

6. Loss of economic sovereignty — the country cannot use its own resources for development because they constantly leak abroad.

PART 7. THE PERPETUAL CREATION OF NEW PREFERENCES FOR THE PRIVILEGED

The system of preferences for the privileged is reproduced and expanded through several channels:

1. Access to offshore instruments — not every businessperson can create Cypriot “laundries” and issue €50 million bonds via private placement. This is the prerogative of those with connections to financial intermediaries and legal structures.

2. Lobbying for exemptions — individual companies and sectors receive the right to export capital under simplified procedures, while others face bureaucratic barriers.

3. Leveraging sanctions restrictions — Type “C” accounts and other mechanisms for blocking non-resident funds create opportunities for those who can offer alternative capital withdrawal routes.

4. Formation of “closed clubs” within state corporations and large enterprises, where access to capital withdrawal instruments is part of informal arrangements (as in the case of Russian Railways and the company “1520”).

5. Modularity of shadow schemes — the legal isolation of each stage allows new structures to be created faster than regulators can shut them down.

DISCLAIMER

This material is a research essay prepared by the editorial boards of Kafedra and SforNews magazines as part of a series of analytical investigations. The work is based on a systemic diagnostics methodology, which involves analyzing events not only through the lens of simple human logic or ethics, but also using all documents, artifacts, and alternative legal constructs available to the editorial team. We do not claim that the interpretation offered is the only correct or officially recognized one. We invite readers to join our investigation and independently evaluate the arguments presented.

INVITATION FOR DISCUSSION

Dear readers!

The history of capital flight from Russia has spanned decades. But today it is acquiring new features that require reflection.

We see a dual reality taking shape:

On one side — macroeconomic stability, declining external debt, controlled outflow, as described by Anton Tabakh and other experts.

On the other — the chronic 3–5% GDP gap between savings and investment documented by TsMAKP. And shadow schemes like Mettmann Public Company Limited, where capital loses its origin faster than regulators can track it.

Questions we put up for discussion:

1. What does chronic capital flight mean for the country if it continues for decades and is measured in trillions of dollars?

2. How are new and new preferences formed for the privileged — those with access to capital withdrawal instruments unavailable to the rest of the business community?

3. Does this dual reality (official statistics vs shadow schemes) create the illusion of a solved problem, when in fact the problem is merely changing its form?

4. What would happen if the sanctions regime weakens — and the funds blocked in Type “C” accounts (₽1.5 trillion and tens of billions of dollars) either flow back or, conversely, find new channels for withdrawal?

5. Who ultimately pays for this system — and what will be the social and economic consequences if nothing changes?

We invite dialogue with:

• Economists and analysts who see the full picture.

• Entrepreneurs who encounter this reality daily.

• Citizens who care where the country’s resources go.

• Everyone willing to discuss not slogans, but facts and mechanisms.

Send your arguments, counterarguments, facts, and hypotheses. We are open to an exchange of views and promise to publish the most substantive comments in future materials.

Why This Topic Matters

Chronic capital flight is not just “numbers in reports.” It is:

• Lost investment in infrastructure, industry, and social services.

• Erosion of the tax base — and, consequently, underfunding of schools, hospitals, and roads.

• Entrenchment of inequality — some gain access to the “financial construction set,” others face another tax hike.

• Erosion of trust in institutions — when the system works for the privileged, all that remains for others is cynicism.

The formation of new and new preferences for the privileged is not a “side effect” but a systemic problem that perpetuates inefficiency and creates the groundwork for future crises.

Send your thoughts in the comments below the article.

Let’s discuss. Let’s search for solutions.

Material prepared by the editorial boards of Kafedra and SforNews magazines.
Analysis is for informational purposes only and does not constitute an investment recommendation.
When citing, attribution to the original source is required.